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PREFACE 
The subject of this thesis is Major-General the 
Baron von Steuben and his role in military events in 
Virginia during 1780-1781. Steuben came south in Novem-
ber 1780 with Major-General Nathanael Greene to help re-form, 
re-equip, and re-man the Southern Army. Finding Virginia 
potentially valuable, General Greene detached General 
Steuben soon after their arrival with the primary mission 
to remain and expedite supplies and manpower southward. 
While so engaged, Steuben also assumed a secondary mission 
when he found himself, for a time, military commander of the 
Continental and state militia forces in Virginia. His per-
formance from November 1780 until October 1781 with an eval-
uation of his successes, failures, strengths, and weaknesses 
is the central theme examined here. This thesis is limited 
to this period of service which was, in itself, filled with 
events that brought him both praise and criticism. 
In completing this study, the efforts of many people 
must be recognized. The personnel at the University of 
Richmond Library and the Virginia State Library provided 
valuable time and advice. Special thanks go to Terry Long, 
Sandra Picchi, Ethel Slonaker, and Tim Heigh of the Virginia 
State Library for their invaluable aid. The friendly assist-
ance of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Research Ar-
chives, the Valentine Museum, especially Michael Sanchex-
Savaadra, and the people of the Virginia Historical Society 
Research Library also aided in many ways with my research. 
Thanks, too, go to Professor Harry M. Ward, 
who acted as my thesis director. His comments and 
criticism contributed immensely to bringing the thesis 
to completion. I wish also to extend my special appre-
ciation to Nita Bender for her long hours spent editing 
the text and to Glenda Giddens and Kay Durr for the long 
and difficult task of typing the manuscript. Finally, 
I wish to thank my wife and daughter for their concern 
and support. 
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CHAPTER I 
Commander of Virginia Forces 
Following the disastrous loss by Major-General 
Horatio Gates to British forces at Camden, the American 
troops had either been captured or scattered throughout 
North and South Carolina. General George Washington 
had received news that General Charles Lord Cornwallis 
intended to pursue the advantage and increase his hold 
on the southern states. Any doubt of this was dispelled 
when General Alexander Leslie landed in Virginia in 
October 1780. From the American view it was absolutely 
essential that a new commander be sent to reassemble.and 
rebuild the troops into a Southern Army which could 
oppose moves General Cornwallis would surely make. To 
do this successfully meant providing a commander who 
possessed the respect of the people in the South. Gen-
eral Washing·ton proposed to the Continental Congress 
that Major-General Nathanael Greene would be the proper 
person to carry out this duty. Nominated by General 
Washington on October 22, 1780 in a letter which was Tead 
before the Congress on October 27, General Greene was 
confirmed on October 30 and orders were cut appointing 
1 
him to command the American Southern Army. On October 
22, 1780 General Washington wrote to General Greene that: 
• • . I also propose to them to send Major General 
the Baron De Steuben to the Southward with you; his 
talents, knowledge of service, zeal and activity 
will make him very useful to you in all respects 
and particularly in the formation and regulation of 
the raw troops, which will principally compose the 
Southern Army. You will give him a command suited 
to his rank; besides employing him as Inspector Gen-
eral. • • • He will take your orders in Philadelphia.2 
Major-General Nathanael Greene would command and Major-
General the Baron Frederick Wilhelm von Steuben would 
form and regulate the~raw troops. 
On the same day Washington also informed Baron 
von Steuben that: 
Though • • • sensible how important your services 
will be in this quarter; yet as to the Southward, 
there is an army to be created, the mass of which 
is at present without any formation at all, your 
services there will be still more essential; and 
... I have recommended it to Congress to send 
you with General Greene to the Southern Army.3 
Whether the army was to be created or rebuilt, the task 
ahead was formidable. The Southern Army's success at 
rebuilding would require the experience in organization 
and training of Baron von Steuben. 
The confidence expressed by General Washington 
in his letter was not in the least unfounded. From the 
time of his arrival at Valley Forge on February 23, 1778, 
Steuben had been deeply involved in providing military 
instruction to the American Army. Steuben had been 
schooled in the Prussian style of military drill while 
serving as a captain in the Prussian Army, and he brought 
this knowledge with him to America. To perform these 
training responsibilities, General Washington set.up the 
2 
temporary department of inspection with Steuben at the 
head. Under him were five inspectors who, by working 
with the brigade-inspector, were to teach the soldiers. 
The improvement this training gave the troops became ap-
parent to General Washington, and he was impressed suf-
ficiently enough to write the Continental Congress on 
April 30 asking that Steuben's talents be noted and 
official recognition of his position be given. On May 5, 
1778 the Congress formally established the Department of 
Inspection, ratified Steuben's appointment as Inspector-
General and gave him the rank of Major-General. 4 In 
1779 Steuben took the procedures he had been using to· 
teach the troops and produced a set of regulations for 
training and drilling the American troops. This manual, 
first printed in 2,969 copies, would be the standard 
throughout the remainder of the war. 
On November 3, 1780 Steuben with his commander, 
Nathanael Greene, prepared to depart Philadelphia--Major-
General Greene to assume command of the Southern Army and 
Major-General Steuben to recruit in Virginia. Assignments 
confirmed and orders in hand, they departed Philadelphia 
on November 3, 1780 for the inn~at Chester, Pennsylvania, 
thirteen miles down the Delaware River.5 
By November 5 the party arrived at Head of Elk, 
Maryland, and by the 12th, at Mount Vernon. At some 
3 
' point after November 4, Steuben parted company with 
General Greene and went on to Mount Vernon, where he. 
enjoyed Mra Washington's hospitality while waiting for 
Greene to rejoin the party.6 
During the period when Steuben went on to Mount 
Vernon, General Greene met with various state officials, 
including the Maryland legislature, to improve public 
confidence in the struggling Southern Army so necessary 
to gain the support of the southern states. As General 
Greene wrote, "the whole southern operations will depend 
upon the stores coming from the northward. 11 7 Following a 
brief visit with Mrs. Washington, the travelers pressed 
on to Fredericksburg, where they arrived on November 14 
looking for the inn formerly operated by Virginia Brigadier-
General George Weedon.8 
The remainder of the journey was completed by 
November 16, 1780, when the group arrived in Richmond, 
Virginia. During the following six days, the generals 
were met by state officials, and took advantage of Gov-
ernor Jefferson's hospitality.9 
During the period from November 16 to November 21, 
General Greene's time was filled with letter writing and 
conversations aimed at establishing the importance of his 
mission to the South with the civil authorities of the 
various southern states and the reliance his army would 
have upon supplies provided by them.10 He likewise made 
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the decision that Steuben, with his experience in train-
ing and organizing, would best aid him by remaining in 
Virginia as an intermediary who could expedite support 
southward to him. On November, 20, 1780, therefore, Gen-
eral Greene wrote a letter to Virginia Governor Thomas 
Jefferson in which he stated: 
I propose to sett out in the morning for Hilsborough, 
but shall leave Major Genl. Baron Steuben to command 
in this State for the present, and to put things in 
the most proper train for forwarding the Reinforce-
ment of Men, and supplies of every Kind to the Sou-
thern Army. He will advise with your Excellency.11 
An attachment to this letter was General Greene's 
requisition for the Southern Army, the first paragraph of 
which provided Baron von Steuben with his immediate in-
structions: 
The state immediately furnish its quota of Troops 
agreable to the new Establishment, and that the Men 
be supplied with cloathing, Blankets, Arms, and 
every Accoutrement necessary for equipping them for 
a Winter's Campaign, and that Lawson's Corps, and 
Steuben's Brigade of Militia Continue in Service 
till the.regular Regiments are formed .... 
The attachment then went on and called for ·the state to pro-
vide a magazine of ten thousand barrels of flour, five 
thousand barrels of beef and pork, three thousand head 
of cattle, one hundred good wagons with a driver, four 
good horses and harness complete to each wagon, two hun-
dred hogshead of rum or brandy and that provisions and 
forage be provided at the different places of rendezvous 
for receiving recruits. It would also provide forty 
5 
artificiers, of whom twelve would be shipwrights or boat 
builders, twelve house carpenters, four wheel wrights, six 
smiths, three armorers, two saddlers and one harness maker. 
Finally, five thousand dollars would also be provided to 
defray the contingent expenses of the army. 12 Neither 
General Greene nor Baron van Steuben were under any miscon-
ceptions as to the ease with which these needs were going 
to be met. 
General Greene felt he had brought all the pres-
sure to bear that he could for the time being. All that 
remained was to issue the orders necessary to sustain 
military operations in Virginia and notify General Wash-
ington of the steps taken. Also on November 20, he issued 
instructions on the arrangement of the Virginia line, the 
inspection of stores, revitalization of the State Quarter-
master General's Office, and notified Major-General Peter 
Muhlenberg, Rrevious commander of the Continental forces 
in Virginia, to report to Steuben and take his orders. 
He then wrote General Washington that, "I think the 
legislature will adopt your Excellency's plan for filling 
their regiments for the war. But I foresee very great 
difficulties in arranging the officers of the Virginia 
line, as there are so many prisoners of the war and such 
great discontent among them. 111Y With that General Greene 
left Richmond on November 21, 1780, heading for Hillsbor-
ough, North Carolina. 
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Steuben was not idle during this initial period: 
It had been his responsibility to take stock of the 
military forces in Virginia in preparation for taking 
command. What he found was very upsetting. The three 
essentials of the military: organization, manpower, and 
material were in complete disarray.14 
Steuben began immediately in making changes to 
right the chaos which existed. Some changes were for the 
better and some for the worse. To understand the how and 
why, Steuben's motives should be examined. While he came 
to America principally to train and organize troops, he ~ 
nevertheless had always desired a field command in order 
to prove himself and start him down the "road to glory 
and great possessions," as he was told by those in 
France who had convinced him to come.15 By going with 
General Greene, he was getting this opportunity. The 
stop in Virginia, while certainly necessary, was not be-
lieved by Steuben as any great obstacle to this goal. 
It was a simple case of no organization, no administration, 
no training, and insufficient arms. He felt capable of 
solving the problems and turning things around within a 
few months; he would then once again be free to join 
General Greene and obtain his long-awaited command.16 
Henry "Light Horse Harryn- Lee's Corps, given orders to join 
General Greene in the South by General Washington on Octo-
ber 22, 1780, together with the troops Steuben would send 
from Virginia, should, when the remnants of General Gates' 
7 
army were included, be a worthy fighting force with which 
to join. 
Steuben, knowing his recruits for the Southern 
Army would have to come from the only ready source of 
manpower in Virginia, turned his attention to the mili-
tary forces in Virginia. He discove~ed they were of 
three types: the state militia, under Generals Robert 
Lawson and Thomas Nelson;l7 approximately nine hundred 
Continental troops who were under General Muhlenberg's 
cornrnand; 18 and the State Garrison Regiment, a small unit 
used to guard harbors and ports, with a special garrison 
in charge of the defense of govern~ent buildings and. 
officials. 1~ In addition to being varied, these forces 
were also widely separated--so much so that Steuben wrote 
to Governor Jefferson that: 
Instead of forwarding Genl. Greene the reinforcements 
he Expected, we are Keeping a Number of Corps dis-
persed about the State, where no Enemy has been these 
Eight Days thereby Exposing General Greene with an 
inferior force to the Enemy, and exhausting w123t 
little provision was Collected in this State. 
Steuben selected militia principally from Lawson's 
troops to prepare to march southward to reinforce General 
Greene and notified Governor Jefferson by letter that they 
were to be dispatched on December 2, 1780. To his sur-
prise he received a resolution of assembly by the Virginia 
legislature directing that General Lawson's troops be 
discharged. 21 Shown a copy of the resolution by General 
Lawson himself, Steuben had no choice but to comply and 
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then seek another source--the Continental troops under 
General Muhlenberg. When Steuben directed four hundred of 
the best equipped be detached under Colonel John Green to 
reinforce the Southern Army, he found that the officers of 
this detachment were unpaid and ill-clothed, with scanty 
provisions. Consequently, they had become discontented 
to the point where a paper complaining of ill treatment 
by the state was_ written, and the officers expressed their 
determination not to march until their grievances were 
redressed. Baron von Steuben went to General Muhlenberg 
who spoke to the troops, persuading them to withdraw the 
paper, which they did.22 
When General greene arrived at the location of 
the Southern Army, he was so upset by the appearance and 
state of preparedness of the Virginia troops, he com-
plained that no more should be sent in that condition.23 
Another delay then was inevitable and it took Colonel 
William Davies, Commander of the Continental Depot at 
Chesterfield Courthouse several weeks to find enough 
muskets and clothing to outfit a detachment of four hun-
dred Continental recruits.24 This provoked Steuben to 
write from Petersburg: 
I came here Yesterday in full Expectation of sending 
off Colo. [John] Greenes Detachment of 400 Men this 
Day, and it is with great pain I have to inform.Your 
Excellency that so far from being ready to March I 
am even fearfull they will not be able to March at 
all. · 
Amongst the 400 Men selected . • • about 60 only had 
blankets. • • . 25. 
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Finally overcoming the major obstacles, the troops 
were ready to march on December 14, 1780 in the company 
of the three hundred troops of Henry Lee's legion, which 
had arrived in Virginia. They were on their way south as 
Washington had ordered in October. Steuben gave him 
twenty-five men to replace a like number lost to desertion 
along the way. Then the total force numbering some seven 
hundred Continentals left to join the eight hundred Conti-
nentals who comprised the Southern Army. 26 More would 
need to be sent. Steuben was responsible for maintaining 
certain numbers of troops in the army based on quota 
allocations provided to Virginia by the Continental Con-
gress. On December 16, 1780, Steuben wrote Governor Jef-
ferson from Richmond that "the number required by Congress 
is for the Infantry 5448. Cavalry 844. Artillery 544. 
For Lee's and Armand's Legion's 50. In all 6886. 1121 
In addition to recruiting troops, Steuben also 
set out to reorganize the military forces of the state to 
provide better internal control, more effective adminis-
tration, and a better knowledge of the amount of arms and 
equipment in the state. As Steuben wrote: 
Under the orders of General Muhlenberg I found about 
1100 Men, enlisted for various terms 18 months to 
three months in general, naked of body. Besides .•. 
the remains of the state regiments consisting of 120 
men for the war .... 
Besides the above the State had raised at a great 
expense a Corps of volunteers under Brig. General 
Lawson to serve for six months--Said to consist of 
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7 or 800 men I received them at Petersburg and found 
only 57 cavalry and 203 infantry under arms .. 
I am afraid that the arrangement of the Va line .on 
the new est~blishment will be attended with many dif-
ficulties. 2~ 
After Steuben sent the 425 troops to General Greene, 
his remaining force at Chesterfield Courthouse "by a re-
turn delivered me a few days. ago they do not· amount to 600 
Men. 1129 Most of these were sick and lacked clothing, blan-
kets, and other·essentials. In order to determine how 
many troops were dispersed throughout Virginia, Steuben 
published the following notice in the Virginia Gazette of 
De,cember 23, 1780: 
By ·the Honorable Major General Baron de Steuben,· 
commanding the troops in the state of Virginia. · 
The Honorable Congress of the United States having 
directed that the officers of the state.of Virginia 
on Continental establishment should assemble together 
that their lives may be arranged under the new regu-
lations of the 21st of November las.t: I do, there-
fore, hereby direct all Continental officers belonging 
to the line of this state to repair to Chesterfield 
Courthouse, on or before the 10th day of February now 
ensuing; in order that their respective claims may be 
considered, and finally decided upon. And should any 
officer fail to attend at the time appointed, without 
furnishing proper reasons for his absence, it will be 
considered as a resignation. All such of the afore-
said officers who are in the vicinity of Chesterfield 
Courthouse, are to repair thither as soon as possible, 
to take charge of the trooRB who may be ready to march 
to join the southern army.) · 
At the same time the Virginia General Assembly passed a 
resolution authorizing regiments to be raised to meet the 
new army establishment. These troops were to total three 
tpousand, but because of constant losses to sickness and 
11 
desertion, Steuben felt this was still too small a number. 
"I am informed that the Bill which passed the House of 
Delegates ••• has limitted the number to 3000-- by. far 
too small a number for the end proposed. • 1131: . . . 
In fact, the whole system by which troops were 
recruited had been unsatisfactory to Steuben.· Earlier in 
December Steuben had written a series of letters to Gover-
nor Jefferson in Which he recommended changes which would 
better meet the needs of the Southern Army. In the first 
letter on December 9, 1780 ,- Steuben stated that "The Fre-
quent abuses that have happened • • • and an absolute 
Necessity that those Men who are raised for the War in 
Future should be fit for the Service and the Continent and 
State no longer deceived, by having Old Men, Deserters, ~c 
&c, imposed upon them; I have made the ••• [following 
instructions •••• 11 3 2 These instructions called for 
recruits under fifty years of age, in good health, deliv-
ered by the county lieutenant, and all be accounted for 
and under proper control. A list of all bounties and 
other payments should be kept so that any subsequent de= 
sertion can be discovered. On December 16 Steuben wrote 
the second letter in which he addressed himself to another 
area of recruiting--the quota system. Steuben, following a 
familiar system, referred to the European system calling 
for the recruits to be selected in accordance with a class 
system proportioned as nearly as possible according to 
12 
property. This system required that: 
each class be obliged to furnish a Man for the 
War by a certain fixed period otherwise to be 
subjected to a Draft. The recruit so furnished 
to be considered as a representative of the class, 
and in case of Death by sickness; or Desertion 
to ~e re~laced by t~J Class in one month after 
notice given •... 
Steuben was convinced that these changes would solve 
the recruiting problems. Although the first suggest-
ion was implemen_ted and the second was not, the real 
promoter of recruiting was invasion by the British. 
The greatest success in Continental recruiting came 
when the threat was most imminent. 
Even when the troops were on hand, the other ~ide 
of the problem appeared. There was never enough of any-
thing to equip them. Steuben spent much time on obtaining 
arms, clothes, blankets, and food for the recruits, but it 
never seemed to be enough. Repeatedly Virginia was called 
upon for all types of provisions, and repeatedly the sup-
plies were given; however, the limited funds and credit 
of Virginia could not provide it all. Though Virginia's 
efforts were in the best spirit of support, they con-
stantly fell short of the goals.34 
Another area with which he had become deeply in-
volved almost from the first days after his arrival was 
fortification of strategic areas susceptible to British 
attack. Since almost all movement was carried on by wa-
ter, particularly during the winter, the areas requiring 
fortifications were those that commanded the main rivers 
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and bays of the state. H~re, as it was with men and sup-
plies, Virginia seemed willing to do something but was 
unable to provide complete and resolute action. This was 
illustrated by an attempt by Steuben to fortify a princi-
pal defensive site on the south side of the James River 
about twenty miles south of City Point between Flowerdew 
Hundred Creek and Ward's Creek, called Hood's. This site 
had been a flourishing mercantile center with a cooper' .s 
shop, a smithy, ·and two large tobacco warehouses built on 
a 100-acre tract owned by John Hood. At this point there 
was also a ferry between his place and Weynoke on the 
north side of the river. Besides this, the river narrowed 
at this point, from which it could be defended with a for-
tified emplacement. A fort at this location would give 
advance warning of any attempt to move up the river toward 
Richmond, and would, if properly protected, slow down any 
enemy's progress to allow the city to make defensive prepa-
rations . .35 
Early in 1780 Governor Jefferson had charged 
Colonel George Muter of the state garrison to construct a 
battery at Hood's. He obtained the assistance of the 
owner, Walter Peter, and construction was begun. By Sep-
tember 1780 it was apparent that a supply of bricks could 
not be located, so the fort was not completed. In Novem-
ber 1780 Steuben, with the assistance of Colonel John C. 
Senf, prepared a report after visiting Hood's on what needed 
to be done. In transmitting the report to the House of 
14 
Delegates of the advantageous position of Hood's, he 
declared that it was "considered as very capable of 
opposing the passage of vessels." The General Assem-
bly took no action other than to table Senf's report. 
In spite of this leisurely effort, the fortress did 
manage to receive three 18-pounder and one 24-pounder 
cannons with a brass 8-inch howitzer. Work on the para-
pets to provide .embrasures for the gun positions was 
also completed al thot!gh the battery itself was not com-
pleted. The identity of the workers or the source of 
the cannon is not known.36 
As a start, Steuben was making good progress .. In , 
just over a month and a half, Steuben had called in the 
scattered forces, made efforts to improve recruiting of 
additional troops, given some promotion to the organiza-
tion of his recruiting efforts through the use of depots, 
sent troops to General Greene, and had applied some effort 
to providing.security from attack by water, a most likely 
prospect. Those were the actions Washington and Greene 
had expected of Steuben, and he was fulfilling their trust. 
Another side of Steuben had yet to be tested--that of 
field commander. 
15 
CHAPTER II 
Arnold's Invasion 
; 
At 8 a.m. on Sunday, December 31, 11781:; .Governor 
Jefferson received a letter from General Thomas Nelson, 
enclosing a letter from Jacob Wray, which told of the 
ominous developments in the Chesapeake Bay. Passing 
this information to Steuben, he said: 
I have this moment received information that 27 
sail of vessels, 18 of which were square rigged, 
were yesterday morning just below Willoughby's 
Point. No other circumstance being given to con-
jecture their force or destination •••• 1 
Steuben had been a trainer and organizer. This emerge_ncy 
would be his trial as field commander, and he would not 
fare too well. Immediately after receiving Jefferson's 
letter, Baron von Steuben dispatched Colonel Senf, his 
engineering expert, and Captain James Fairlie, an aide, 
down the south side of the James River to gather intelli-
gence as to tne ships'nationality, strength, and destina-
tion. General Nelson was dispatched by Jefferson down 
the north side of the James River to assist in this iden-
tification; an~ if British, to call up militia capable 
of opposing the force. Steuben himself went some of the 
way with Senf towards Hood's before returning to meet 
with the Governor's Council on January 2, 178i1. The fact 
that the vessels and soldiers were British, under the com-
mand of newly commissioned Brigadier-General Benedict 
Arnold, was co~firmed on January 2, 1781, when Colonel 
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Nathanael Burwell~ County Lieutenant of James City Counti, 
reported that the vessels were British and had advanced 
as far as Wa:r.r.asqueak Bay. The fleet, consisting of nine-
teen ships, two brigs, and ten sloops and schooners, had 
departed New Jersey carrying a force which Washington's 
intelligence had estimated to be twenty-five hundred men. 
Enroute one ship became separated from the fleet during a 
storm and-did not reach Virginia in time to join the first 
invasion. The actual raiding party in Warrasqueak Bay 
was nearer sixteen hundred men. 2 That day Steuben met 
with the governor and his council--David Jameson, William 
Fleming, Andrew Lewis, George Webb, and Jacquelin Ambler--
in Richmond, and a decision was made to immediately call 
the following militia to assist the Continental troops: 
... one-half of the militia of Henrico, Hanover, and 
Goochland counties and one-fourth of the militia of 
Fluvanna, Albemarle; and Amherst to rendez-vous at 
Richmond; one-half of the militia of Chesterfield, 
Powhatan, Cumberland, Dinwiddie, and Amelia, and one-
fourth af the militia of Buckingham, Bedford, Hali-
fax, Charlotte, Prince Edward, Lunenberg, Mecklen-
berg, Sussex, Southampton, and Brunswick were ordered 
to rendez-vous at Petersburg.3. 
In addition, orders were issued to organize rifle com-
panies of men called up from Shenandoah (216 men), Rock-
ingham (219~men), Augusta (344 men), and Rockbridge (146 
men) counties to move arms and other stores from Petersburg 
toward Richmond and to bring the powder from the powder 
mills to Westham. Major Richard Claiborne was to have 
boats collected at Westham to move supplies across the 
17 
river if a threat developed there. Completing their 
deliberations, the legislature adjourned and carried the 
4 
orders for militia back to their respective counties. 
Baron von Steuben, staying at Wilton, then lo-
cated on the James River below Richmond, shuttled back 
and forth between Richmond and Chesterfield Courthouse. 
He wrote a letter to George Muter, Commissioner of War 
for Virginia, dated January 1, 1781, informing him that 
"the present alarm has occasioned my ordering four hun-
dred of the [Continental] troops at Chesterfield to hold 
themselves in readiness for marching. 115 However, on 
January 2, 1781, Steuben found that only one hundred· fifty 
of the Continental troops at Chesterfield Courthouse were 
physically able to fight. These were formed into a batta-
lion and sent to Petersburg to protect supplies stored 
there until Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Carrington could 
6 get there and remove them. As Steuben moved about be-
tween Richmond, Chesterfield Courthouse, and Manchester, 
he was most interested in where the enemy was bound. 
Governor Jefferson had stated that since confirmation of 
the first sighting of the enemy had not been received in 
the five hours or so, as had been expected, he had come to 
the opinion that "the first intelligence should be totally 
disbelieved."7 William Tatum, reporting to Steuben.the 
evening of January 2, found everything in total confusion. 
Even after confirmation of the identity of the invading 
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force on January 2, 1781, the destination was still un-
known. It might still have been Williamsburg, Jamestown, 
Petersburg, Richmond, or maybe even beyond to Charlottes-
ville, where British soldiers constituting the remnant 
of General John Burgoyne's Convention Army still resided. 
Accordingly, Jefferson wrote a letter to Francis Taylor 
in Charlottesville to move the British to "Fort Frederic," 
in Maryland.8 
On the morning of January J, General Arnold's 
fleet was off Williamsburg and Jamestown. Though he put 
a party ashore, they reembarked almost immediately. This 
was possibly because of the militia General Nelson and 
Colonel James Innes had collected and brought to Williams-
burg. General Nelson had informed a courier sent from 
Arnold that he intended to defend the town. As the 
fleet moved upriver, uncertainty over the probable 
destination of the fleet narrowed. Arnold was bound to 
be headed for Petersburg, Richmond, or Westham. Once 
past Williamsburg, the next point from which the fleet 
could be opposed would be Hood's. Major James Cooke of 
the militia and Captain John Allen of the State Artillery 
Regiment had managed to assemble about seventy-five men 
there. Steuben continued to have great faith in the 
ability of Hood's to repel an enemy, so he hoped that 
these men could slow down or deter the advance. By even-
ing word was passed that the fleet had passed Brandon 
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Plantation eight miles below Hood's and the first British 
schooner advanced under the guns and was fired upon by the 
18-pounder. By 10 p.m. the remaining ships anchored below 
Hood's, and twenty small boats carrying one hundred thirty 
tro9ps were dispatched to Ward's Creek to subdue the Ameri-
can garrison. Afraid of being overrun, the defenders 
pulled back; but before departing, they fired two more 
rounds of warning toward the ships. By 12 midnight, when 
the British forces~ arrived, they found the battery aban-
doned. The troops spiked the cannon, burned the gun car-
riages, and carried off the howitzer. With no further 
action possible at that late hour, the Brrtish fleet qrew 
up near the fortifications and anchored for the night.9 
On January 4, 1781, the fleet made its· inten-
tions known. Leaving Hood's, the fleet proceeded to West-
over and began disembarking troops on the north side of 
the James River. They were headed for Richmond.lo Al-
though Arnold expressed doubts at first as to whether to 
march in the face of a militia surely accumulating at 
Richmond, Lieutenant-Colonels Thomas Dundas and John Sim-
coe persuaded him that the magazines at Richmond were 
worth it. The British. troops accordingly left Westover11 
and advanced as far as Four-Mile Creek, where they en-
camped for the night. 12 
In response to the arrival of General Arnold this 
far up the James River, Governor Jefferson changed the 
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previous order of January 2 in which the· county lieu-
tenants were instructed to send only a portion of the 
militia to an order in which they were instructed to 
send all the militia. 
The rapid Approach of the enemy renders it 
necessary that for instant Opposition you em-
body the whole able to bear arms. Should they 
not be armed, there are Waggons loaded with arms 
at Chesterfield Courthouse. • • • I must desire 
that you without a moment's delay send every 
man in your County able to bear Arms to rendez-
vous at Westham.15 
On January 4, 1781, Jefferson told Steuben that: 
Majr. Dick calls on me for an order for the 
militia of this place to march. I beg you 
will be so good as to consider the militia 
of every place as under your command from 
the moment of their being embodied, and to 
direct tUeir motions and stations as you 
please.l 
Steuben was then in charge of all the troops. Mean-
while, even as this new responsibility was being passed 
to him by Jefferson, Steuben spent the day around 
Richmond collecting any remaining militia. Although 
a sizable force was gathering in Manchester, there 
were, to his surprise, only about one hundred in Rich-
mond.15 These he organized under Major Alexander Dick 
of the state militia and sent them down the James 
with instructions to oppose the enemy at every pos-
sible opportunity. In th~ confusion of the moment, 
Major Dick, who was completely unfamiliar with the terrain 
and who had also found that he was in receipt of poor 
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intelligence about Arnold's whereabouts, misunderstood 
and stumbled around, at first marching east toward the 
Chickahominy River, then back toward Richmond. This 
movement kept the Americans from opposing the British 
approach.16 In advance of the British troops, Steuben 
sent the remaining Continental stores and provisions out 
of Richmond toward Westham, then across the river to be 
dispersed in the countryside. The state provisions, which 
were located in Richmond, were also moved out of town to 
the west. These, however, were not under the direct 
control of Steuben, but of the Commissioner of the Vir-
ginia War Office, Colonel George Muter.17colonel Davies 
was directed to move all the stores out of Chesterfield 
Courthouse, relocate the hospital, have the tailor and 
tanner move from Warwick to join the smith and staff at 
Chesterfield Courthouse, and order the one hundred fifty· 
Continentals sent to Petersburg on January 2 to march 
back up and take position across the river from Westham. 
In addition, he was to bring the remaining Continentals--
sick, clothed, armed or not--to Westham. Having directed 
this movement from the headquarters at Chesterfield Court-
house, Steuben retired during the evening of January 4 
to Manchester to collect the militia assembled there and 
oppose any effort the British might have made to cross 
the Jarnes.18 
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While Steuben waited on the south side, the 
British approached Richmond along the north. Departing 
their camp on Four-Mile Creek the morning of January 5, 
the British troops rebuilt a bridge across the creek 
that the American troops had earlier destroyed. Prior 
to reaching Richmond at about 1 p.m. on January 5, the 
British encountered American troops two times. The 
first was an encounter with the party which had burned 
the bridge; the second was a patrol about seven miles 
southeast of Richmond. When the British finally reached 
Richmond, numbers of militia, some armed but many others 
not armed, appeared before the British at Church Hill. 
This force included Major Dick, his militia, and spec-
tators. When an assault was attempted on the hill by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, the troops fled into the sur-
rounding woods. Following this assault, the British 
moved on to Shockoe Hill and dispersed the Americans 
there. 19 
Throughout the time Arnold was on the north side 
of the river, Steuben had remained on the south side. 
His disposition of troops at Manchester was to protect 
his lines of supply and retreat, and he ignored the fact 
that all the political and military targets a reluctant 
general could want were readily available north of the 
river. (Arnold did not march on Richmond until persuaded 
2J 
by his officers). This reluctance by Steuben to directly 
oppose the British must be attributed to a lack of know-
ledge of how effective his small number of troops would 
be in combat and insufficient information about his opposi-
tion. Perhaps if he had remained in Richmond and opposed 
Arnold directly, he would have been soundly defeated. As 
it was, a greater damage was done in the minds of Virgin~ 
ians concerning the ability of his military force to defend 
the state. This in turn affected the willingness of the 
people to support the military effort. 
Having returned from pursuing the retreating sol-
diers in Richmond, Simcoe was told to take the Queen's 
Rangers, together with the flank companies of the 80th, 
and mar.ch on and destroy the foundry, laboratory, and 
magazine at Westham. 20 
Prior to the arrival of Simcoe at Westham and 
while Steuben was at Manchester, Governor Jefferson went 
to the foundry on the evening of January 4 to observe 
for himself how Steuben's directions to Major Claiborne 
were being carried out. There he met Captain Nathaniel 
Irish and others. Together they spent most of the night 
moving the powder, arms, and munitions out of the foundry 
and across the river in the boats Major Claiborne had 
provided. The next morning, after moving his family·from 
Tuckahoe across the river to Fine Creek, Jefferson re-
turned, and "finding the arms &c. in a heap near the shore, 
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and exposed to be destroyed by cannons from the North 
bank, he had them removed behind a point of land near 
by.1121 
Steuben left Manchester after seeing that Arnold 
was not seriously considering the crossing of the James. 
His destination was Colonel William Fleming's· house in 
Powhatan County (near Midlothian). Here on the evening 
of Friday, January 5, 1781, he met with Governor Jeffer-
son. While there, the two were presented a proposal 
from General Arnold carried by several businessmen from 
Richmond. The proposal stated that if Richmond were 
surrendered without resistance, the city would then be 
spared and only the tobacco taken. Neither Jefferson nor 
Steuben would agree. 22 
At about this time, Simcoe arrived at Westham and 
destroyed everything he found. He broke the trunnions off 
the cannon and broke up a large quantity of small arms 
and military stores.· He set fire to the boring mill, the 
magazine, the ordnance repair shop (laboratory), John 
Ballandine's house, and one or two warehouses. Some of 
the state documents which had been brought to Westham also 
were destroyed. The foundry itself had only its roof 
burned off; its chimney remained intact. 2 3 The magazine 
had originally been set to be blown up but: 
Upon consultation with the artillery officer,- it 
was thought better to destroy the magazine than to 
blow it up, this fatiguing business was effected 
by carrying the powder down the cliffs, and pouring 
it into the water; the wtrehouses and mills were 
then set on fire •••• 2 
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Finally, after raising five cannon dumped into the 
river by departing American troops and destroying them, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe and his troops returned to 
Richmond, arriving late the night of January 5. There 
the men, fatigued with the march, fell asleep or got into 
private homes and obtained rum. Though large scale 
plundering was strictly forbidden by the British, damage 
and looting by "straggling parties" was significant and 
costly. The tobacco requested as ransom for the city 
the day before was untouched. Even so, as the British 
prepared to leave Richmond, fire was set to several pub-
lie buildings, the ropewalk, warehouses, and workshops. 
These fires also destroyed several houses and one of the 
town's two printing presses. While much of the blame is 
given to the British, Americans, both white and black, 
were also responsible for fires and looting in the town. 25 
In the end, buildings and property in all parts of Rich-
mond were severly damaged or burned. Steuben, mean-
while, prepared to move east from Midlothian through 
Manchester and south to Warwick. January 6 was the day 
he stopped waiting and began the chase. 26 
Just after noon on January 6, exactly twenty-
four hours after coming to Richmond, retracing his steps 
toward Four-Mile Creek and Westover, Arnold left behind 
a town covered by a great" cloud of smoke, with provisions 
and liquor strewn about the streets. Toward evening it 
began to rain hard in Richmond. 27 
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As Arnold and Simcoe retraced their steps toward 
Westover, the American troops moved forward to keep an 
eye on them. General Nelson, who had been protecting 
Williamsburg, kept his troops north of the James River, 
but moved them steadily up to Charles City Courthouse 
while Steuben, still on the south side of the river, at 
first moved south to Warwick on January 6 to protect 
the grain stored there, and then to Osborne's on January 7. 
As they moved, both Steuben and Nelson received militia 
responding to the call of January 2 and 4. Since Steuben 
had ordered the dispersal of arms at Petersburg, Richmond, 
and Westham to prevent their capture, no arms were on hand 
to give the new arrivals. When he left Midlothian, Steu-
ben had about one hundred fifty armed Continentals, plus 
two hundred militia which he had picked up at Manchester 
on January 5. By the night of the 8th, when Steuben had 
reached Petersburg and joined the militia under Colonel 
Gibson, his force numbered about eight hundred. Suffi-
cient numbers of these men were unarmed to prompt Steuben 
to write to Governor Jefferson on January 6 to send one 
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thousand stand of arms.- . Unfortunately, most of the 
good arms saved from Westham which could be found had been 
given to the Hanover militia. The rest were scattered in 
church eaves, barns, or otherwise hidden away. Try.as 
they would, neither Colonel Davies, George Muter, nor 
Governor Jefferson could obtain the arms required. On 
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January 7 Steuben paused in his movements south of the 
James long enough to write from Osborne's that with 
more militia arriving all the time, the shortage of 
arms was becoming critical. On the 8th Governor Jeffer-
son managed to find some cartridges to send to Steuben 
and to General Nelson, but the arms were still inaccess-
ible. 29 
General-Nelson, watching General Arnold, wrote 
to Governor Jefferson that on Saturday, January 7, he 
had intended to attack the British rear, but ''· •. the 
Gates of Heaven were opened, and such a Flood of Rain 
poured down as rendered my Plan abortive by almost drown-
ing the Troops .... n30 Instead, on January 8 a patrol 
of the Queen's Rangers, which had set out for Long Bridge, 
captured several riders who told of an assembly of some 
of General Nelson's militia at Charles City Courthouse. 
Turning in that direction, Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe 
and a small detacl~ment reached the a~ea in the early 
evening. In the action which followed, the militia was 
dispersed.31. Steuben, still moving along the south side 
of the James, was camped in Petersburg without means to 
cross the James River. 
Though it has not been conclusively shown that 
Steuben's real concern had been the defense of Chester-
field County from the Courthouse to Petersburg, it prob-
ably was on his mind. On January 9 Steuben concluded that 
Arnold's inactivity at Westover was not a prelude to 
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attack on Petersburg. He therefore moved the militia 
further south to Prince George Courthouse. Receiving 
word early on the morning of January 10 that the Brit-
ish were reboarding their ships, Steuben immediately 
returned to Coggins Point, located across the river from 
Westover, and personally observed the loading. Steuben 
turned again to the battery at Hood's. He sent Colonel 
George Rogers Clark with three hundred infantry and 
thirty horse cavalry to the abandoned fortress to oppose 
the fleet when they went downstream. Though the cannon 
had been rendered unusable, the British would still stop 
to make sure. At 12 noon the fleet got underway and· by 
4 p.m. had reached Flowerdew Hundred, where at dark a 
force of approximately five hundred troops were put 
ashore in eighteen boats to examine the battery. 32 
Gen. Arnold had scarcely landed, and Col. Dundas, 
with the 80th regiment, was not yet on shore, 
when a patrole of the enemy fell into the ambus-
cade of ·the Yagers, and exchanged shot with them: 
the night was very dark. Gen. Arnold directed Lt. 
Col. Simcoe immediately to march toward's Eland's, 
with Col. Robinson's regiment and his own infan-
try; but the cavalry did not land. The detachment 
had not proceeded above two miles, when Robinson's 
co~ps in front received a heavy fire. There was 
no room for disposition, for the road ran through 
a wood which was remarkably thick, at the forks 
of which, as the clearest ground, the enemy had 
placed themselve~. Upon the firing, the troops 
were immediately ordered to charge; they rushed 
forward and the enemy fled: near twenty of Col. 
Robinson's regiment were killed and wounded .•.. 
. . . The troops returned to Hood's battery, which 
having totally dismantled, they carried off the 
heavy artillery and quitted it; the next day re-
embarking and falling down the river.33 
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That same night, January 10, Steuben had marched 
with his militia to Eland's Mill, about seven miles from 
Hood's. The following day, Thursday, January 11, he 
arrived at Hood's, but the British had left. He ordered 
three hundred infantry and two troops of horse cavalry 
to continue on to Cabin Point and, for the first time, 
sent 560 militia across the river to reinforce General 
Nelson at Williamsburg. General Arnold continued down 
the river; making no further attempt to land until reach-
ing Hardy's Ferry twenty-two miles below Cabin Point. 
There the British began their march toward Smithfield, 
where they arrived without incident on January 15. From 
January 16 to 21 Steuben remained at Cabin Point, while 
on January 19 General Arnold reached Portsmouth, where 
he disembarked, established his camp, and sent his ves-
sels on down to Hampton Roads. Steuben, meanwhile, left 
Cabin Point ?n January 21 and, following the path of the 
British troops, arrived in Smithfield on January 22.34 
On his arrival Steuben stationed the American troops 
with the express purpose of: 
. • . preventing the Enemies parties from making 
incursions into the Country on either Side of the 
James River or should they undertake to come out 
with their whole force, to render any enterprize 
of theirs difficult, always having in view the keep-
ing open the communications across James River.35 
To do this, Steuben deployed troops on both sides of 
the James River to observe and contain General Arnold. 
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General Muhlenberg was placed in command of all forces 
south of the James, and General Lawson commanded all 
forces north of the river. General Nelson backed them 
up with one thousand militia located in Williamsburg. 
Steuben had not done well in the first effort 
as a field commander. Throughout the campaign he had 
been on the wrong side of the river and unable to· oppose 
the British. Because of this, he was only able to pre-
vent a raid on Chesterfield Courthouse and Petersburg. 
At the same time he allowed the British free access to 
Richmond, the seat of Virginia government, and the foundry 
and arsenal at Westham. He also lost control of arms and 
supplies needed for offensive action against the British 
after the attack. Only the desire of General Arnold not 
to overextend himself and his overriding intention to 
return to Portsmouth before he could be captured saved 
Virginia from worse depredations. A military commander 
cannot long afford these mistakes and avoid defeat. The 
people of Virginia were also taking notes. They would 
want to know why such an intrusion could have been made 
over a nineteen-day period with so little resistance. 
Both Steuben and Jefferson would be called upon to 
justify their actions.36 
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C.HAPTER III 
Logistics and Manpower Problems 
Baron von Steuben survived his first military 
action in Virginia. It formed a part of a learning pro-
cess which had begun at Chesterfield Courthouse while 
trying to bring organization to the Continental Quarter-
master Department and promoting cooperation between the 
Continental troops and the Virginia militia. In November 
1780, when Steuben began his organizational effort, all 
manner of activities were centered in Richmond. When the 
government had moved from Williamsburg, the city had be-
come th~ staff headquarters in Virginia with all the con-
fusion such a move meant. Here, in one area, was the state 
government, the laboratory, offices of all sorts, and even 
the location of one of the four Continental quartermaster 
depots. 1 
Steuqen, however, soon took a step wh_ich decreased 
somewhat such centralization. He separated a portion of 
the Continental and state government and quartermaster 
organizations by moving some activities to a county court-
house. These courthouses were points where county govern-
ment, court, and the militia assembled and where other 
affairs of mutual interest to all residents of the county 
were transacted. About ten miles south of Richmond was 
one such location known as Chesterfield County Courthouse. 
Once before, this location had attracted the attention of 
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Governor Jefferson and Steuben's predecessor, General 
Peter Muhlenberg, who felt its location made it ideal 
for quartering recruits. Steuben likewise felt this 
way and that in addition to a troop rendezvous, it 
would also be an excellent choice for a Continental depot 
because it was near enough to the capital at Richmond 
for ease of communication and a place from which the 
business of the quartermaster department could be con-
ducted. It was also far enough away to be reasonably 
safe if the capital should come under attack. The 
barracks at Chesterfield County Courthouse which were 
quartering the new recruits could be refurbished and from 
here Steuben could establish a program of drill and mil-
itary instruction. Other buildings including the jail 
located there could be used for manufacturing and storage 
of supplies, with land available for more barracks if 
necessary. 2 Chesterfield County Courthouse now joined 
the other three depots, Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and 
Petersburg in stocking items for the military. These 
movements were directly in line with Steuben's respon-
sibility to preserve Virginia as a source for men and 
materiel and to keep them moving southward. As Greene 
specified in his letter of December 8, 1780: 
• . • inform the state that the troops must be prop-
erly found with everything to fit them for servjce, 
or that they will not be received. Use every agru-
ment you can to convince the Assembly of th~ neces-
sity of clothing their troops. If they mean they 
shall render any service (to the army) or do not 
wish to fall a sacrifice to death, desertion and 
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disease, I beg them to give their men good cover-~ 
ing, for without it this will be their portion.j : 
Steuben also wrote the same day to Washington 
that he was well aware that the state of internal affairs 
would require improvement before he could meet his respon-
sibilities to General Greene. 
. The derangement of the finances is more sensi-
bly felt here than in any other part of the continent. 
All the wheels of the administration are stopped; 
the late invasion of the enemy has completed the 
confusion. (General Leslie in October 1780) The 
few articles which were in the Continental as well 
as State magazines were distributed, without any 
orders, to the several corps of Volunteers, Militia, 
etc., and although the strictest orders have been 
given to collect the whole, I fear a considerable 
number will be lost. 
The Quarter-master's Department and indeed almos~ 
all the departments here have no head. The Exec~ 
utive part of the administration is carried on only 
by expedients, while the Legislature cannot agree 
on any system whatsoever. They are now debating 
on the state of finances, and the new arrangement of 
the army has not yet been taken into consideration. 
Nothing will be more difficult than to arrange the 
line of office~s of this state according to the new 
Establishment • 
. 
One of Steuben's first steps was to appoint Col-
onel William Davies to oversee the assembling and equip-
ping of troops to be sent to General Greene. Steuben 
also charged him with the renovation of the barracks, 
conversion of the courthouse into a hospital and trans-
formation of the two jails--one for debtors and the 
other for criminals--into magazines for the storage of 
food and supplies. Additionally, Davies would be re-
sponsible for constructing new barracks for the troops 
and a tailor's shop from wood in the nearby forests.5 
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As construction and renovation progressed, Davies began 
to move the supplies at Richmond to Chesterfield Court-
house. It became the largest and most important recruit-
ing and supply depot in Virginia and the key to an over-
all plan to improve the organization of the quartermaster 
departments. 
It would take more than this realignment to solve 
the logistics problems facing Steuben. They were deep 
and widespread. ·To properly assess the magnitude of these 
problems and Steuben's handling of them, each of the major 
categories of supply, transportation, and manpower must 
be considered--so too must Steuben's relationship with 
the Virginia government. 
During the early part of the war, militia units in 
Virginia had secured supplies directly from merchants who 
had in turn billed the government for payment. Before 
long, fraudulent or inflated claims were being submitted. 
This had cau~ed disputes over reimbursements and a clamor 
for tighter control of funds.6 In order to correct the 
abuses, changes in both the Continental and state quarter-
master departments were taking place. Such was the case 
in Virginia when Steuben arrived. To improve the relia-
bility of the departments, people were appointed who could 
work with the Continental officials in Philadelphia and 
the Virginia state officials to solve the problems inter-
fering with supply support for the Southern Army.. These 
people had to be not only resourceful and innovative but 
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9ften stubborn when they found themselves having to com-
mandeer and impress supplies from the local populace. 
Steuben appointed Major Richard Claiborne to be 
Continental Deputy Quartermaster General for Virginia. 
In addition to the Continental position, Claiborne was 
also Virginia Quartermaster General until March 1781. 
Finding both jobs entirely too difficult to perform, 
Claiborne finally resigned the state post and was suc-
ceeded by Captairi Henry Young.7 Other Continental 
quartermaster personnel with whom Steuben, Claiborne, 
and Davies would work were John Peyton, Clothier General 
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Carrington, Deputy QMG; Captain 
Charles Russell, Assistant Deputy QMG; John Lightfoot, 
Assistant Commissary of Hides; Captain Berryman Green, 
Continental Deputy Quartermaster; and William Aylett, 
Commissary of Supplies. 8 On the whole, the Continental 
organization was capable and dedicated, but Steuben soon 
found that eyen with the best of organizations, some 
problems were insurmountable. 
In the early war years of 1776-1777, Virginia had 
been a state with a very prosperous economy. This pros-
perity had enabled the state to be generous in providing 
supplies to the war effort. The state raised sufficiently 
large crops of foodstuffs, not only to feed the popula-
tion, including the army, but also to offer them for ex-
port.9 Virginia also had one of the largest producing 
lead mines in the colonies, located in the western part 
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pf the state. 10 Although almost all arms were important, 
most Virginians possessed a weapon to use for hunting and 
protection as well as to comply with a law in Virginia 
requiring every man to own a firearm while serving as a 
member of the militia. Clothing, too, was often imported, 
but since the militiaman wore ordinary clothes rather than 
a special uniform, that which was available or locally 
manufactured satisfied the day-to-day needs of the militia. 
During 1777 when powder was plentiful, large quantities 
had been purchased and stored in Henrico, Dinwiddie, and 
Chesterfield Counties. 11 Virginia had the materiel 
to support an army. 
In the latter years of the war, the picture 
changed. Shortages of many items began to appear and so 
did the problems in supply. The main problem areas in 
supply were in arms and ammunition, clothing and leather 
accoutrements, food, and funding responsibility. 
Steuben found that so many weapons had become unser-
viceable or lost by 1781 that the lack of weapons was affect-
ing the army's ability to conduct warfare. Except for the 
. 
few weapons made at Hunter's Arms Works in Fredericksburg, 
and the Kentucky and Pennsylvania rifles which were 
brought in from ·the Frontier, most of the arms in Vir-
ginia were French; including the muskets which were.the 
main weapon of the infantry. 12 As these weapons_ became 
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damaged, they ~ere at first taken to Westham. 13 After 
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its destruction, provisions were made to send the dam-
aged arms wherever workmen skilled at repairing arms 
could be found and hired to make the required repairs. 
This was not always easy to do for some artisans found 
ways to avoid this type of work. One such instance 
occurred early in January when William Davies tried unsuc-
cessfully to obtain the services of a Mr. Cunningham to 
help repair arms damaged when Arnold moved up the James 
River to Richmond. Not every man placed patriotism first. 1~ 
Steuben brought the problem up on April 21 when 
he wrote: 
The great distress we are in for Arms has determined 
me to deliver out all those we have here (Chester-
field Courthouse) that were destined for the Recruits, 
excep 150 which I have delivered to the recruits that 
are here. I have at the same time taken the arms out 
of the hands of the Artificiers, in order that they 
may be delivered to the Militia. Notwithstanding our 
Distress I find that the 1,000 arms which have been 
distributed to the troops under Genl. Muhlenberg are 
not in a condition to be used. 
I have 6rdered Capt. Prior to establish ~ Manufactory 
for the reparation of Arms at Powhatan Co. Hq. I 
have written to Genl. Muhlenberg to send the Armorers 
from Broad water to that place that they may be imme-
diately set to work, but as more hands will be neces-
sary for the reparation of so great a number of Arms 
in so short a time, I request your Excellency to fur-
nish as many armorers as possible .••• lB 
Though arms never would be in good supply and 
there would always be newly arrived recruits who were 
without any kind of weapon, Steuben's efforts at least 
provided some serviceable arms for the militia in the field. 
Powder and lead were also a problem. Lead, which 
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was from the Virginia mines had been available in large 
quantities but since then, quantities of the metal had 
been squandered, sold, given away or used up until now 
lead supplies were almost depleated. 16 Powder too had 
once been ample to meet Virginia's requirements. Now, 
however, Virginia powder requirements, rested on the 
meager imports from the West Indes, stocks brought in 
from elsewhere, and that which was produced in labora-
tories. One such laboratory had originally been estab-
lished in Richmond. Colonel Timothy Pickering, a member 
of the Continental Board of War and active in quarter-
master affairs, had noted that a Continental laboratory 
in Virginia would significantly aid support to the ~rmy 
in the South so in conjunction with Lieutenant-Colonal 
Edward Carrington, Pickering explored the possibilities 
of moving the laboratory to Westham and expanding it to 
handle Continental needs. Becoming one of the largest 
and most complete facilities in America, this laboratory 
not only repaired arms and made cartridges but also cast 
cannon in its foundry. 11 It served in this capacity until 
its destruction in January 1781, after which it never 
18 
again was able to achieve its former capability. Other 
items in extremely short supply were clothing and leather 
accoutrements. When the Virginia government decided to 
establish factories and hire artisans to make footwear 
and overalls to meet the shortage, two locations; Peters-
burg and Albemarle Barracks, were designated as centers 
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for clothing manufacture. 19 However, to satisfy require~ 
ments for clothing, blankets, and accoutrements the items 
had to be imported from outside the state or abroad, and 
these sources fluctuated in reliability as press~re by 
the British increased or decreased. The troops could 
never seem to get enough of anything. William Davies re-
ported on the unresponsiveness of the supply: system to 
Jefferson on January 25, 1781: 
I found . ~ • that all the troops • • • had by order 
of.Baron Steuben come back to this station, from 
their utter inability to keep the field, from a want 
of almost every species of cloathing. Many men have 
not a remnant of cloathing larger than a good napkin 
to cover their nakedness, and a number of these are 
dependent upon others for a part of· a blanket to shel-
ter them at night from the cold ..••• Unless some 
method can be adopted for supplying the men, th~y 
had much better be dismissed altogether; they are 
not able to do any thing in the field, and near 60 
of them too naked to do any thing in quarters, and 
every idea of training them for actual service has 
long since been laid aside. 
On those items which were provided_, a distinct lack of 
coordination was evident when they were issued to the 
soldiers. 
• • • Another great misfortune is the manner of 
issuing the cloathing. A good pair of stockings is 
given to a naked soldier today; he has no shoes and 
wears them out by the next week, and in a fortnight 
afterwards when his stockings are gone, he gets his 
shoes; Or perhaps he gets his breeches, but no lin-
ing to them; a new coat or a fashionable hat, but 
has no shirt, or if he has, he is without breeches. 
By this means, the country runs into d~Bt, and the 
soldier is always uncomfortable •••• 
Food would seldom be a problem in Virginia.· As 
the British invasions followed one another, however, 
Steuben would be required to replace rations captured by 
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the enemy. For example, following the Battle of P:etersburg, 
large quantities of flour were destroyed on board vessels at 
Osborne's, and quantities of foodstuffs were destroyed at 
21 Warwick. In addition, Steuben would have difficulties 
with forage for horses and would even levy fines against 
individuals when forage was available but not given. 
Compounding the shortages of supplies was a short-
age of money as well. While Continental army letters of 
credit were accepted earlier in the war with minimal 
resistance, the value of Continental currency had become 
so depreciated by 1780 that individuals receiving quarter-
master certificates in payment for supplies or services 
complained bitterly. The certificates were of such little 
value that county officials would not even accept them in 
payment for taxes. 22 No efforts by Steuben could solve 
this problem. He was only able to pressure the govern-
ment to still provide money so supplies could be bought. 
Als~ facing Steuben and master departments were 
problems of transportation--especially water transporta-
tion. Supplies and equipment in the American colonies 
had always moved by one of three means--carried by the 
colonist, loaded onto pack animals or wagons, or in the 
boats and ships which sailed the waters of America. 
Though boats were the best means by which materiel, 
including military supplies, could be moved to and · 
within America, Steuben and his staff in Virginia would 
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.have difficulty moving supplies to the Southern Army 
because all the rivers flowed in the wrong direction. 
Supplies needed to move south from New England, Mary~ 
land, and Pennsylvania through Virginia to General Greene 
. 
in the South. Using the rivers which flowed northwest to 
southwest, the supplies traveled many miles and sometimes 
days out of the way. There was also a distinct shortage 
of deep draft vessels capable of carrying a significant 
quantity of goods. Before the war most of these ships 
were British and were lost to the colonists when hostil-
ities broke out. Even if there had been large numbers of 
these vessels, the British Navy would have quickly cap-
tured them since there was no significant American Navy 
to protect them. 
The primitive roads in Virginia were not much 
better for they were little more than footpaths, dusty 
in summer and wet and muddy in winter. In the winter, in 
fact, most military activity came to a halt and the troops 
established camps in which to rest until_ good weather once 
more allowed operations to begin again. There were reasons 
for this. The mud and snow would become so deep that move-
ment of supplies would be paralyzed for days or weeks at a 
time. The type of transportation would also create prob-
lems since supplies were only given minimal protection 
from the weather, large quantities of supplies coul4 be 
destroyed simply moving the items from one place _to 
another. Yet, for all these difficulties, the horse or 
9x and wagon became the principal vehicle for moving 
military supplies in Virginia. The owners of these 
wagons, who in other ways supported the war effort, 
would do almost anything to prevent their horse or oxen 
and wagon from being impressed. This is understandable 
when it is realized that their wagon was the only way 
they had for moving items to market.23 
On April 4, 1781, Richard Claiborne wrote Jeffer-
son concerning his frustration over the lack of wagons: 
The great demands which are made upon me for things 
to be furnished from this department, both for the 
Southern Army and the Troops within this State, 
alarm me more and more, as I have Not the means to 
answer any purpose whatsoever. I am called upon 
by the Commissary General of Purchases, and the 
Commissary General of Military Stores for Wagons 
and horses daily, to transport their Stores and· 
have it not in my power to procure any. The prep-
arations which the Baron directed me to make for 
the Cavalry and Infantry to be equipped in this 
State cannot be done, as I have not money to pur-
chase, and I cannot get credit for an Article • 
• • • In short Sir, I plainly foresee, that unless 
I have great aid from some near resource, the opera-
tions ~f the whole department will stop in a few 
days. 2 · 
On April 9 he.again complained to Jefferson: 
• • • I have failed in all my endeavours towards 
obtaining the wagons ..•• having no Public Waggons 
in the State but what are already appropriated, and 
that very necessarily; I ask Government for aid, or 
I m.ust decline the attempt, as I have no2~ossible prospect for accomplishing the business. ~ 
These shortages were especially frustrating to 
Steuben who had asked Davies and Claiborne to move mate-
riel for use by the army. Delays could be expected when-
ever wagons could not be found or when they had to be 
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moved long distances such as from Fredericksburg to 
Richmond or from Williamsburg to Point of Fork. Davies 
set out to solve the problem by repairing and manufactur-
ing wagons at Dinwiddie Courthouse. Although some wagons 
were completed there, this created no solution partly 
because the artisans, especially reputable blacksmiths, 
were expensive and hard to find. More progress was made 
by sending a highly regarded person out to gather what 
his talents and reputation would allow. 26 
Still another problem was manpower. In 1775, Vir-
ginia had boasted well over fifty thousand white males of 
military age (sixteen to fifty years) under a universal 
militia obligation. During the intervening years, the 
warfare had made many demands on this pool of manpower. 
A number of Virginia soldiers were committed to guarding 
the British prisoners of war or ''Convention Army" from 
the surrender at Saratoga, and another force had been 
dispatched to the western frontier. Additionally, in May 
1780, when the British captured Charleston, almost the 
entire active Virginia Continental line was taken prisoner. 
Two weeks later, Banastre Tarleton's cavalry defeated Col-
onel Abraham Buford's recruits, who had been sent to 
reinforce the Virginia Continental regiments. On August 
16, the defeat of General Gates cost Virginia another two 
hundred state regulars when virtually the whole army was 
sent scurrying from the field with heavy losses. Of those 
troops remaining after the battle, most were reluctant to 
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rejoin any military force.27 
If Steuben was to make use of the available man-
power in supporting Greene, a number of problems basic to 
militia organization had to be resolved. Financial respon-
sibility for troops under Continental control, the militia 
system with its county lieutenant and court-martial, the 
philosophy regarding exemptions for artisans·and others 
critical to the war effort, and the provision of direct 
reinforcements to the Southern Army when it was outside 
Virginia--these were all problems in this category. 
When Jefferson placed all military forces, includ-
ing the militia, under Steuben's command at the time of 
General Arnold's invasion of Virginia in January 1780, 
Steuben became deeply involved in the question of finan-
cial responsibility for the militia during periods of 
crisis. Regulations at the time stated that under these 
conditions, state forces became the responsibility of the 
Continental 9ongress in matters of pay and support. Steu-
ben, however, made it very clear that the Continental 
forces assumed responsibility only when the militia· actu-
ally "took the field, armed and formed into a fighting 
force. 1128 
Less successful were his encounters with the 
Virginian militia system. In Virginia, the county lieu-
tenant acted as liaison between the governor and the 
county on administrative matters relating to the militia 
and the county court-martial directed the militia, 
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approved promotions, and controlled the draft. Each was 
an important element of the organization, without whom 
militia would.not be raised. Unfortunately, the county 
court-martial was not responsible to the county lieute-
nant, however it alone decided whether the militia would 
report often; therefore, the wishes of the Governor could 
be lost if a conflict existed between the two elements. 
The power of the court-martial was not inconsequential 
because a large ~ounty had as many as twenty to twenty-
five companies and each company had from thirty-two to 
sixty-eight men. Steuben's arrival in Virginia had caused 
friction in this area from the beginning. Steuben had 
intended to recruit volunteers and take all who came "his 
way, equip them from state stores, and send them south. 
This philosophy ran directly opposed to the state militia 
system where officers gained rank by the number of men 
they brought with them. To compound the situation, these 
officers and members of the court-marial were usually the 
most influential people in a county. There was, there-
fore, a tendency to favor the local system instead 9f the 
needs of a Continental officer who would take his share 
and leave. However, Steuben found himself in the unique 
position of maintaining both systems when he became Com-
mander of all Virginia troops following Arnold's invasion. 
Steuben continued his efforts, however, and considering 
the significance of the problem, was able to obtain Con-
tinental recruits though not in the numbers desired. As 
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the war intensified in Virginia there was also a greater 
difficulty in obtaining all troops. 29 
Steuben was also confronted with those who needed 
exemptions from military service. Many of these requests 
were from the government, personnel of the quartermaster 
departments, and the artisans and artificiers who were 
employed by the quartermaster department. While anyone 
could apply for exemption, few were approved. Though pro-
viding fair treatment for everyone, it soon created short-
ages of some skills needed in a community to provide con-
tinued support. On one occasion all the tailors at the 
Petersburg clothing manufactory were drafted by the county 
court-martial. An appeal was made to Steuben but when he 
did not intercede to try for an exemption from the gov-
ernor, the whole facility had to be closed down.30 As 
the war progressed, these shortages became recognized and 
such jobs as wagon master and armorer were granted exemp-
tions. For example, John Lightfoot, Assistant Commissary 
for Hides, became the subject of a request for exemption 
which was approved because without him there would have 
been a shortage of leather for saddles and other cavalry 
equipment.31 The reason for this low approval rate was 
the widespread belief held by Steuben and the civil auth-
orities that the draft was equitable, honestly run, and a 
man's chances of receiving the call were not that great. 
Early in the war only Continental forces.were 
expected to fight outside their home state. If an 
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~xpeditionary force had to be raised, the troops volun-
teering to go were enlisted or transferred to the Con-
tinental forces for a specified period, usually eighteen 
months. When volunteers were not available, a draft was 
implemented with each county being given a quota to fill. 
The remainder of the militia would be used to defend the 
local population within the county. Sometimes, however, 
when this process would be too slow to meet emergencies, 
the state militia from the counties closest to the threat 
would be employed directly. Virginia responded in this 
way when Greene was being pursued by Cornwallis to the 
Dan River. Once this militia was called up the county 
court martial might then agree for the militia to remain 
on duty with the Continental troops without being trans-
ferred. Such was the case from March 1 to March 15, 1781 
when more than twelve hundred militia, including two bri-
gades of eastern Virginia militia under Generals Edward 
Stevens and Robert Lawson and another two from western 
Virginia under Colonels-Charles Lynch and William Campbell, 
were in Greene's army. These militia troops were ~f great 
assistance to General Greene but since they had a shorter 
term of enlistment they could only be counted on for two 
to three months.3 2 
As the overall commander of the Virginia forces, 
Steuben assumed the responsibility for these problems but 
the real burden for their resolution rested on Colonel 
William Davies. In November and December, Davies had 
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.only been responsible for the operation of the depot at 
Chesterfield Courthouse while George Muter was Commis-
sioner of the Virginia War Office and responsible for 
recruiting, training, and supply. Steuben had formed a 
dislike for George Muter when he was unable to provide 
weapons to the troops in the hectic days when General 
Arnold attacked Richmond in January 1781. From that time 
until Muter's replacement in March, Steuben wrote and dis-
cussed Muter's incompetence with Governor Jefferson. 
Because of this feeling Steuben placed his faith and much 
of the work on the shoulders of Colonel Davies. When 
Davies became Commissioner of the Virginia War Office on 
March 22, 1781, as well as Commander of the Continental 
Depot at Chesterfield Courthouse, his work became even 
more involved and his control of supplies even more far-
reaching. Only after the arrival of Lafayette, and 
relief from the pressure of command, was Steuben able to 
work more closely with Davies in obtaining supplies for 
the Southern Army, but by then his interest was under-
mined by his problems with Virginia officials. 
Steuben's relationship with the administration 
of the state of Virginia had been worsening for some 
time, since both the state and Steuben felt that the 
full measure of effort was not being given by the other. 
He felt that the state government was too critical of 
his activities, and the state felt that, given the chance, 
Steuben would remove men or arms southward from the state 
to the detriment of local defense. The result was two 
forces who at first amicably disagreed but promised each 
other all possible aid, then quietly did what they wanted 
to do~ Later the disagreement was to turn to distrust 
and then to genuine dislike. 
This lack of cooperation was demonstrated when 
Steuben and Colonel Senf drew up plans to reconstruct a 
fortified battery at Hood's. These plans were submitted 
to Governor Jefferson on January 29, 1781, calling for a 
battery of "Eight 24 to 18 pounders and defended in the 
Rear by a strong Re~oubt for Sixty Men and four or two 
Field pieces, mounted in the Angles in Parapet."33 
Although the Virginia government approved these plans, 
as of February 11 no workmen had been hired to begin to 
work on the battery. On that date Steuben wrote an angry 
letter describing the past plans and delays and asked the 
governor to "consider the shamefull opposition made to 
the last incursion of the enemy" and stated his "wish to 
prevent a repetition of the disgrace." However, he added, 
"I can do nothing without the Assistance of the Govern-
ment. n 34 In his reply, Governor Jefferson stated that 
the project was approved, but all technical aspects and 
hiring of labor would be left to Colonel Senf. The delay 
which had occurred, he went on to say, "were produced by 
circumstances which it was not in our power to control. 11 35 
Besides encountering difficulties in cooperation, 
Steuben and Virginia governmental officials were also 
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beginning to doubt each other's motivations, forming a 
more basic mutual distrust. Steuben was having more 
trouble keeping his Continental and State responsibilities 
operating in cooperation. Steuben felt that the reluc-
tance of the state to support his efforts could prevent 
his joining General Greene or even perhaps spell defeat 
for his army. The officials felt that any person who 
would take a significant percentage of the men and arms 
from a state and then leave it could not possibly have 
the interests of the state in mind. Steuben, therefore, 
was mistrusted because it was felt that he threatened 
the state's security due to his strong loyalties outside 
the state. Steuben, for his part, did not deny he h~d, 
on a number of occasions, indicated his intent to march 
south to meet General Greene. 
Areas other than support of the troops also gave 
the Virginia government reasons to believe in Steuben's 
_incompetence.or unreliability or both. The first was 
the incident at Westover, when, during February 1781, 
Steuben became embroiled with Mrs. Mary Willing Byrd 
over the use of truce flags. When General Arnold de-
parted Richmond in January, he took forty-nine slaves 
from Westover belonging to Mrs. Mary Willing Byrd. Soon 
after, she applied for a truce flag from Baron von Steu-
ben for the purpose of recovering them.· Although Steuben 
stated at the time he did not know of the new policy, 
Jefferson had issued a letter prohibiting their use for 
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~he recovery of property. i When Mrs. Byrd used the flag, 
questions were raised about whether she was· taking advan-
tage of her connections and raising a treasonous corres-
pondence with the enemy. Because of Steuben's authoriza-
tion, he, too, came under suspicion.36 Second was the 
discontent among Virginia officers occurring when General 
Weedon was returned to active service. This· was explained 
by Colonel Davies in a letter to Steuben dated February 20, 
1781: 
I am instructed to advise you our opposition to the 
return of General Weedon is not founded upon any 
personal pique toward him but that we can never con-
sent to serve in any army where our rights as officers 
are so essentially injured ••• and with the same 
justice as might General Muhlenberg have retired on 
the same occasion and on the same footing with General 
we·eaon.37 
Steuben's dissatisfaction is shown in this letter 
from Steuben's aide, Major William North, of February 23 
to General Greene: 
The Virginia Line give him (Steuben) the Greatest 
Trouble. The Arrangement is nearly completed and 
they are continually applying for leaves of ab-
sence. • . -. The Baron wishes to be with you. He 
had rather Obey in an Army than Command in Vir-
ginia. 38 
Steuben had been given his mission and had begun 
in a positive vein realigning the Virginia depots by 
improving the administration of the Quartermaster depart-
ment and by channeling his efforts to the accumulation of 
supplies and troops from Virginia resources. Soon, how-
ever, he found that the state could afford to provide much 
less than was required, serious geographical obstacles to the 
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(ransportation of supplies to areas of combat, and that 
insufficient manpower was willing to join the Continental 
forces. These problems then created clashes between Steu-
ben and the Virginia government. The net result was a 
constantly struggling support effort which required the 
full attention of the Commander. When warfare took away 
Steuben's attention, Colonel Davies provided· the main 
emphasis to keep the supplies moving to the troops. Even 
so, since January it had been a struggle just to provide 
the supplies needed to support operations in Virginia~ 
This struggle was irreparably damaging Steuben's relation-
ship with Virginia government officials-. The future did 
not give indications of improving when, on February 15, 
1781, General Greene showed that his army would soon be 
needing help for war was once again returning to Virginia. 
On February 15, 1781, General Greene wrote Steuben: 
• • . the enimy have been daily pressing our rear 
and at this moment are in full march for the river, 
not three miles from our camp. But we are happy 
enough to have the river between us. This will 
delay them for some time •..• 
Whether the enimy will pursue us further is uncer-
tain; but as the Army is so great an object I am 
rather inclined to think they will, for by the 
destruction of this Army they complete the reduc-
tion of North Carolina and lay a great foundation 
for that of Virginia.jg 
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CHAPTER IV 
Opportunity Lost at Portsmouth 
During the last ten days of February 1781, the 
events which most occupied Steuben were the movements 
of General Greene and General Cornwallis and the pressing 
need to provide more Virginia· reinforcements for the 
Southern Army. Steuben received the news from Greene 
of Cornwallis' approach on February 15 and from Gov-
ernor Jefferson on February 17 that: "I have this moment 
received intelligence that Lord Cornwallis continues his 
rapid approach. 111 He immediately followed this news by 
instructing the county lieutenants of Lunenberg, Amelia, 
Powhatan, Cumberland, and Brunswick counties on February 
18 to assemble all the militia and be prepared to march 
to the aid of General Greene. 2 By February 21 Lord Corn-
wallis still prepared to cross the Dan River, and the 
militia from at least one nearby county had joined with 
G 1 G t t •t 3 enera reene o preven i • By February 25, 1781, 
Steuben knew that General Cornwallis had ceased his north-
ward movement after being thwarted in his effort to over-
take General Greene by the rain-swollen Dan River. 
Nevertheless, the counties of Washington, Montgomery, 
Botetourt, Henry, Pittsylvania, Cumberland, Powhatan, 
Chesterfield, Dinwiddie, Amelia, Lunenberg, Brunswick, 
Prince Edward, Mecklenberg, Charlotte, and Halifax had 
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been instructed to call up their militiamen with arms 
to aid in the emergency.4 Of the more than two thousand 
troops who responded, only half that number had the arms 
to be useful to General Greene. Colonel Lawson even 
wrote that he could send another one thousand if they 
could be armed. Before arms were found, the problem 
once again lessened in importance with Lord Cornwallis' 
movement southward.5 
Fear over the approach of Lord Cornwallis made 
other aspects of Steuben's job easier. It was easier 
to obtain Continental army recruits during this time. 
By February 25 Steuben was able to dispatch "400 rank 
and file ••. well armed and tolerably equipped men" 
to the South as reinforcements for General Greene's 
army.6 
During the collection of troops for this rein-
forcernent, an.incident occurred between Steuben and a 
militia colonel which showed Steuben's desire to provide 
good soldiers to General Greene as well as the length 
to which people would go in satisfying the requirements 
for military service. 
Men sufficient to form a regiment had, with much 
pain, been collected together at Chesterfield Court-
house. The corps was paraded and on the point of 
marching when a well-looking man on horseback, and 
as it appeared, his servant on another, rode up and 
introducing himself, informed the·Baron that he had 
brought him a recruit. "I thank you, sir, with all 
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my heart; you have arrived in a happy moment. Where 
is your man, Colonel?" for he was a colonel in the 
militia. "Here, sir," ordering his bo.y to dismount. 
The Baron's countenance altered; he saw and feared 
the approaching storm. A sergeant was ordered to 
measure the lad whose shoes, when off, laid bare 
something by which his stature had been increased. 
The Baron, patting the child's head with his hand 
trembling with rage, asked him how old he was. He 
was very young, quite a child. "Sir, you must have 
supposed me to be a rascal; an infamous rascal, thus, 
to attempt to cheat your country. Take off this 
fellow's spurs; place him in the ranks, and tell 
General Greene for me, Colonel Gaskins, that I have 
sent him a man able to serve, instead of an infant 
whom he would basely have made his substitute! Go, 
my boy, take the Colonel's spurs and his horse to 
his wife; make my compliments, and say her husband 
has gone to fight for the freedom of his country, 
as an honest man should do." 
Colonel Gaskins, fearing the consequences, let the 
man escape on the arrival of the corps at the river 
Roanoke. The man, upon returning, was not tardy in 
making application to the civil authority for re-· 
dress. But Governor Jefferson . • • and other gen-
tlemen of the counc~l • • • prevented any disagree-
able results •••• 
Eager to secure the capture of General Arnold, 
who was still in winter quarters at Portsmouth, Steuben 
read with interest a letter sent to Governor Jefferson 
from General Lafayette which said, ih part: 
I Am the More flattered By the Command Which His 
Excellency, General Washington, Has Been Pleased 
to Intrust to Me, As Independent of the General 
Good that May Be Hoped from this Expedition, It 
seems to Promise an Opportunity to Gratify the 
High Sense I Have of My8 Personal obligations to the State of Virginia.'· 
This letter, received on the last day of February 
1781, was acknowledgment that Major-General Lafayette was 
coming to Virginia to aid Steuben in a campaign against 
General Arnold. Steuben himself had received a letter 
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from General Washington dated February 20, 1781, with 
the information that he had "• •• detached a corps of 
1200 men from this army, chiefly consisting of the light 
infantry, of course commanded by the Marquis de Lafayette, 
which will, I hope, arrive at the Head of Elk about the 
sixth of March to embark there and proceed down the bay 
to Hampton Roads or the point o.f operation ... 9 
Lafayette, in his instructions, was to "open a 
correspondence with Steuben, who now commands in Virgin-
ia, .informing him of your approach and requesting him to 
have a sufficient body of militia ready to act in con-
junction with your detachment. 1110 
.Steuben was pleased but cautious. Although h~ 
desperately wanted the opportunity to capture General 
Arnold, the Marquis de Lafayette was his senior and 
would, upon his arrival, .command the troops in Virginia. 
Difficult though this would be to accept, Steuben turned 
his attention to Portsmouth and made preparations for the 
arrival of Lafayette and the "glorious opportunity of per-
haps exterminating the Enemy in this country," while 
capturing General Arnold because "the grand traitor can-
11 
not escape." 
Since General Arnold had arrived in Portsmouth 
on January 19, 1781, the troops.under General Muhlenberg 
and General Lawson had secured the landward routes from 
the town. There were, however, no vessels to secure the 
seaward avenues of retreat. It was recognized by Steuben 
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and everyone else, including General Washington, that 
some French ships would be necessary to hold Arnold if 
an attack were launched against him. 
On February 9, 1781, a small French fleet con-
sisting of a ship of the line of sixty-four guns and 
three frigates under Monsieur de Tilly departed Newport 
for the Chesapeake to assist against Arnold. However, 
after dropping off eight prizes taken against the Brit-
ish and finding out that the Americans did not consider 
themselves yet able to move against Arnold, the fleet 
withdrew. Much to Lafayette's chagrin, the fleet with-
drew all the way to Newport, throwing into question the 
t . . d f L f tt ' . . · V · · · 12 en ire i ea o a aye e s mission in irg1n1a. 
Meanwhile, General Washington negotiated with the 
French concerning the dispatch of vessels to the Chesa-
peake to coincide with the- arrival of Lafayette. At 
first, General Washington had received only assurances 
that a ca~tur~d man-of-war, the Romulus, would return to 
the Chesapeake. By the time the French completed their 
arrangements, a fully equipped squadron under Monsieur 
Destouches with eleven hundred troops under the command of 
Baron de Viomenil was enroute to Chesapeake Bay. 13 
In spite of the size and strength of that force, 
Lafayette, resting with his Continental troops at Head 
of Elk, Maryland, since March J, was encountering diffi-
culties obtaining ships with which to move to Virginia. 14 
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Finally ~eaching Yorktown on March 14, Lafayette sent 
the following letter to Steuben: 
Here I am, my dear Baron, in consequence of a new 
arrangement which I shall explain to you. I anti-
cipate with great impatience the pleasure of see-
ing you~ and I shall communicate to you the very 
important object which has caused me to precede 
the detachment. As soon as we have talked with 
each other, we shall send an express to the Gen-
eral, who is doubtless impatiently waiting to 
hear from us.15 . . · 
Steuben, meanwhile, had been busy during this 
' 
period making preparations for the arrival of Lafayette 
and the French fleet. After delivering to the governor 
a list of things required at Portsmouth, he proceeded 
to Chesterfield Courthouse where he made an assessment 
of the military personnel and equipment. Steuben noted 
shortages of clothing for his four hundred troops, the 
need and high cost of horses, the shortage of good wea-
pons, the continued need for fortifications at Hood's, 
Newport News, and Yorktown, and the need for an overall 
plan for a s~anding militia of four thousand with good 
arms and equipment which could adequately defend Virginia. 16 
After submitting these observations on March 5, Steuben 
left for Williamsburg where he stayed at the King's Arms 
Tavern. 17 When Lafayette arrived in Virginia and met 
with Steuben, he found that upon his arrival: 
••• Baron de Steuben had been very active in making 
preparations, and, agreeable to what he tells me, we 
shall have five thousand militia ready to operate. 
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This with the Continental detachment (still in 
Annapolis) is equal to the business, and we might 
very well do without any land force from Newport •.•• 
(the troops of the Baron de Viomenil) In your 
first letter to the Baron, I wish, my dear General, 
you will write to him that I have been much satis-
fied with his preparations. I want to please him, 
and harmony shall be my first object.18 
In the letter Lafayette also declined to take immediate 
command of the military forces in Virginia. He felt 
that only when his detachment was present, the French 
fleet had been deployed off Portsmouth, and the opera-
tion was set to begin would he assume command from Steu-
ben. The two officers continued their effort to obtain 
arms, horses, oxen, and artillery for the upcoming c~­
paign. They also visited General Muhlenberg, who was· 
posted at Suffolk. Together they advanced near enough 
to Portsmouth to bring about a skirmish, but a lack of 
ammunition prevented their advancing beyond the outposts. 
They were in this position on March 20 when .word was 
received tha~· a fleet had arrived within the Capes. 
Lafayette sent a French officer from Yorktown to deter-
mine the fleet's identity. When told these were ·not the 
ships expected, "nothing could equal my surprise." The 
fleet, consisting of eleven heavy ships of the line, were 
British. General Muhlenberg immediately took his troops 
back to Suffolk, and Steuben began to transport the sup-
plies and equipment and "take Measures for the Security 
f Such A t . 1 M" ht B E d .,19 o r ic es as ig e xpose . • • • 
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The fleet, after its initial arrival, moved back 
out of the Chesapeake on March 24 and returned to Lynn-
Haven Bay on the 25th, bringing with it a convoy of trans-
ports bearing a detachment of troops from New York under 
the command of General Phillips. The arrival of these 
transports, with every appearance of having .been unmol-
ested by the French, convinced Lafayette and Steuben that 
the operation against Arnold was ended. On March 26 
Lafayette wrote General Washington from Williamsburg: 
The return of the British fleet with vessels that 
must be transports from New York, is a circumstance 
which destroys every prospect of an operation against 
Arnold ...• The expenses of this expedition are 
very great, and the minds of the Virginians are so 
disposed as to make me more obstinate to pursue the 
expedition. Upon it~ success great deal depended, 
particularly for Gal Gree~~ army. Never has an 
operation been more ready [on our side] nor conquest 
more certain. But since wz must give it up, I shall 
return to Annapolis •... 0 
Before Lafayette returned to Annapolis, however, 
Steuben presented him with a plan for his concurrence. 
Although General Phillips had arrived, thwarting American 
dreams of capturing Arnold at Portsmouth, there might still 
be a way to counter the British and.also to remove the war 
from Virginia. On March 27, General Weedon w~ote Governor 
Jefferson: 
The Honble. Major Genl. Baron de Steuben will lay 
before your Excellency, an expedition suggested by 
himself, which meets the full approbation of a 
Military Board convened on the occation and which 
may if agreed to by the Honble: t~l Executive, in 
a great measure terminate the War. 
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Which, in S;teuben's words, was that he 
•.. march with 2,000 men from Suffolk to Hali-
fax . . . Crossing the Roanoke below the falls . 
by pressing on Cornwallis from three different 
points w22should oblige him to retire towards Cambden. 
Steuben felt that Phillips would not actually try an 
invasion into the interior of Virginia and by the Ameri-
cans pressuring Cornwallis in North Carolina, Phillips 
could be forced to move south to assist and would, there-
fore, leave the state. If he did not come to Cornwallis' 
aid, then the forces of Greene and Steuben would be 
strong enough to defeat Cornwallis.· After his defeat 
the combined forces would return to Virginia and defeat 
General Phillips. On March 29, 1781, Steuben presented 
the plan .to the Virginia council. Armed with letters 
from Richard Henry Lee and General Weedon approving of 
the plan, Steuben was convinced the plan would be approved. 23 
It came as a bitter blow to Steuben when the council re-
sponded: 
. taking under their most serious consideration 
the ·proposition of Major General Baron Steuben for 
sending immediately into North.Carolina a Detachment 
of two thousand of the Militia now embodied on the 
south side of James River ... [the council is] of 
opinion that ... the number carry with them bearing 
a very great proportion to what will afterwards re-
main in the State, it will be a matter unjustifiable 
in the present circumstances of affairs the enemy 24 having lately received a great reinforcement. . . . 
After receiving the information, Steuben wrote 
to General Greene on March JO of the plan and the deci-
sion while including a copy of the resolution. Each of 
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the three generals had reasons to feel bitter. Steuben, 
while taking the defeat of his proposal as a personal 
slight, felt also that the disapproval would have danger-
ous consequences for General Greene's army if Arnold and 
Phillips moved south to join Cornwallis. He hoped Vir-
ginia would not come to "repent it before it is too late." 25 
Steuben had, after all, based his plan on the belief that 
the British would not attempt a general invasion of the 
state, and in fact, would probably not even retain their 
base at Portsmouth. 
General Weedon expressed bitterness by saying, "I 
was fearful our Scheme would be rejected by the Executive 
who have not an Idea beyond Local Security. We must 
therefore content ourselves till a force is raised with 
_, 
, which they will have nothing to do in point of direction. "26 
Weedon felt that the state government was too conversa-
tive to be realistic in its judgment. He also believed 
that military matters should be left to the military. 
Greene felt that the Virginia government's decision 
was bad for the more all encompassing reason of command 
and control, the needs and orders of which take precedence. 
If the views of a State are opposed to the general 
plan of operations, and the force in the field can 
only be employed at such points as they think pro-
per, no officer can be safe in his measures: nor 
can the war be prosecuted upon a general scale, 
where partial views have an undue influence.27 
General Greene also felt, as did Steuben, that hi·s position 
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was the most precarious and to deny him support in what 
appeared to be a reasonable move was foolhardy for not 
only Virginia but the entire South. Although Governor 
Jefferson did call on eleven southern Virginia counties 
to support the Southern Army, Greene felt so strongly he 
immediately sent a circular letter to these same counties 
to send well-equipped militia to him along with provisions 
to aid in trying. to "vex Lord Cornwallis if not beat him. "28 
Steuben then decided that there was no longer 
anything for him to do in Virginia except to accelerate 
the departure of what new levies had been collected. 
Furthermore, when they went, he would lead the first 
detachment south to join General Greene, leaving Gener-
als Muhlenberg and Weedon to command the troops. 29 
In the long run, history has shown that it was 
the council and governor whose course of action was most 
prudent since General Phillips had as his intention from 
the beginning the invasion of the interior of Virginia 
and destruc~ion of supplies bound for General Greene. 
In spite of this, Steuben felt as late as June that 
Cornwallis would have followed him if he _led forces 
di' 
away from Virginia. 
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CHAPTER V 
The Battle of Petersburg 
The principal objects of General Phillips' mis-
sion to Virginia were to establish a British post in 
Virginia and then to render direct support to Cornwallis 
by destroying magazines along the James River. Phillips 
was also instructed by General Clinton to examine the 
suitability of Portsmouth as his base and if it were un-
suited as a fortified station for large ships, he was to 
examine Yorktown and Old Point Comfort. 1 The examination 
and fortification of Portsmouth took three weeks-~fro~ 
his arrival on March 27 until his departure for the upper 
reaches of the James River on April 18. 
During this period, Bavon von Steuben had occupied 
his time with the Steuben plan for reinforcement of Gen-
eral Greene. On April 1, 1781, he was still at Chester-
field Courthouse taking stock of the availability of 
troops. Th~ calling up of militia to oppose Arnold in 
January and to counter General Cornwallis in February 
resulted in many militiamen nearing the end of their 
service. Steuben had also concerned himself with the 
Virginia Quartermaster Department and also the perfor~ 
mance of George Muter, the Commissioner of the War 9~fice 
65 
of Virginia, whom Steuben had long felt was to blame for 
many of the supply difficulties of the army. On March 22 
Muter was replaced by William Davies. 2 Steuben envisioned 
that Davies would bring about sweeping changes in the 
quartermaster department; but, since Davies also held his 
old job at Chesterfield Courthouse, the span of his respon-
sibilities was too broad to see an immediate improve-
ment of any magnitude.3 
The armies, both Continental and state, were in 
need of everything--arms, lead, cartridges, and clothing. 
Although the ships under Monsieur de Tilly had brought a 
few merchant ships carrying goods, the supplies in Vir-
ginia were still nearly non-existent. This scarcity of 
supplies, lack of money for payment, and inactivity 
before Portsmouth also caused desertions to increase 
markedly. By April 15 Steuben was forced to write General 
Washington that he was obliged to undertake the defense 
of the count~yside against three thousand regular troops 
with nothing to oppose them but militia. Those militia 
who had served since the beginning of the invasion had 
discharged themselves by this time; consequently, General 
Muhlenberg was left on the south side of the river with 
only seven hundred men and General Weedon on the north 
side with about six hundred men. 
A very great evil resulting from the invasion is, 
that it stops th·e recruiting for the army. So long 
as a county has any militia in the field, 
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that county is prevented from drafting; and as most 
of the counties have had part of their militia either 
here or with General Greene, little or nothing has 
yet been done. • . . [to raise troops] Only fifty-
two have yet come in and of these some have already 
deserted. . . . When they do com4, I am still much 
at a loss of what to do for arms. 
Frustration over provisions and troops was still 
causing Steuben to consider leaving Virginia.. One such 
letter to General Greene, written from Chesterfield Court-
house on April 2, revealed his feelings. 
If I preferred my own inclinations to the public 
interest, I should immediately set out to join 
you; my desire to act under your immediate direc-
tions, and the disgust I have for my situation 
here, are motives equally forcible to urge my de-
parture hence.5 
Again these thoughts would be interrupted.· This time· it 
was General Phillips who brought the war to Steuben. 
As early as April 15, Steuben had been aware that 
movement by General Phillips up the river was only a mat-
ter of time. He had been told that work on the fortifi-
cations at Portsmouth was nearly complete and that con-
struction on some flat-bottomed boats had begun. In 
anticipation of the coming expedition, Steuben submitted 
a plan to Governor Jefferson on April 17 detailing the 
ste~s to be followed if theBritish decided to attack 
within the state. Written at Chesterfield Courthouse, it 
called for the two thousand militia under the.command of 
General Muhlenberg to be armed and ready to oppose the 
British on whichever side of the James River they chose to 
Hood's for exemption from militia duty, it was·; too late. 
In addition, William Davies and Colonel James Innes, com-
manding some of the militia in the field, became so con-
vinced that General Phillips would move against Petersburg 
and Richmond that they tried desperately on April 16 to get 
wagons and teams impressed to transport over ·qne hundred 
fifty wagon loads of supplies from the depots at Petersburg 
and Chesterfield Courthouse to safer locations. 8 Steuben 
completed the confusion by ordering the dispersal "as high 
in the country as necessary" of the supplies accumulated 
for use in the Portsmouth operation. All in all, when 
Phillips moved, it came as no surprise; but, as usual~ the 
supplies which would soon be so desperately needed were 
deposited some distance from where they would be needed, 
·including as far away as Point of Fork.9 
On April 16, 1781, Phillips embarked his men on 
twenty-five flatboats, each carrying one hundred men, and 
began moving upriver with General Muhlenberg following 
Steuben's o~ders, keeping track of their movements. 10 
The twenty-five boats, preceded by the gun boat, 
··Benetta, paused at Old Point Comfort, then moved on and 
took the gun emplacement at Burwell's with only minor 
opposition. Following its occupation, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Simcoe with the Queen's Rangers was directed to march 
toward Jamestown and, if possible, surprise any batteries 
which might wait in ambush. Having marched during a dark 
and rainy night: 
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•.. on the 20th, Lieutenant Colonel Abercrombie, 
with the light infantry, proceeded up the Chicka-
hominy in boats; Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, with a 
detachment to York; Lieutenant Colonel Dundas, with 
another detachment landed at the mouth of the Chick-
ahominy; and Major General Phillips and myself landed 
with part of the army at Williamsburgh, where about 
five hundred militia were posted, who retired upon 
our approach. The militia at York crossed the Diver 
before the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, who 
made a few prisoners, spiked and destroyed some can-
non, and next day returned to Williamsburgh. 
On -the 22nd, the troops marched to Chickahominy. We 
were met on· the road, five miles from the mouth of 
the river, by Lieutenant Colonel Dundas with his 
detachment; this evening the troops, cavalry, artil-
lery, etc., were re-embarked. The next morning we · 
were [re] joined by Lieutenant Colonel Abercrombie 
with the light infantry, who had been ten or twelve 
miles up the Chickahominy and destroyed several armed 
ships, the state shipyards, warehouses, et6~i1 
· Later on April 22, the British fleet passed the 
deserted battery at Hood's. By April 23 the fleet was 
off Westover, and on April 24 they reached City Point and 
disembarked. During this part of the expedition, General 
Phillips, according to Simcoe, had emphasiz~d ·th~~e· 
primary obj~cts: 
. . . to surprise, if possible, a body of the enemy 
stationed at Williamsburg, at any rate to attack 
them. ~ . . 
... to obtain possession of Hood's -battery, now 
reported to be closed, without unnecessary risk; to 
open all obstructions on the James river, and to 
seize the arms said to be at Prince George Court 
house. 
. . . to gain Petersburg for the purpose of destroy-
ing the enemy's stores at that place, and it is· 
public stores alone that [were] .•. intended to be 
seized.12 
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Steuben, however, remained at Chesterfield where 
he was attempting to recruit a force of cavalry until 
certain of Phillips' destination. Henrico, Prince George, 
Dinwiddie, Goochland, Hanover, Powhatan, Cumberland, 
Amelia, and Chesterfield counties were called up. 13 
On April 21 Steuben~ commanding the forces, had 
begun to move the troops into a position allowing flexi-
bility of movement but still principally influenced by an 
anticipated move toward Petersburg. He directed the mili-
tia assembled at Richmond to remain in place, but those 
in Manchester were ordered to move to Petersburg to re-
. " 14 
lieve others who were to be'"m6ved :ta· Bland"·s. Ordinary. 
Steuben believed that while Phillips was definitely 
headed toward Petersburg, he was also: 
. . . of the opinion that the Enemy mean for the 
present, but to occupy the Neck of Land between 
the York and James River as high up as Williamsburg 
. . . I am endeavoring to have the fortifications 
at Hood's put in the best state of defense possible; 
and making what other preparations in my power, to 
oppose the Enemy should they advance on this side 
[southside] of the James River.15 
Steuben also felt he had time to undertake the instruction 
and drill of his troops and ordered that they be "exer-
cised in marching in the morning and the manual in the 
afternoon. 1116 
That same day, however, the drilling and marching 
at Chesterfield Courthouse came to an end when Steuben 
received notice of the British passing Hood's and their 
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immediate approach to Westover. He directed Colonel 
Innes to ''approach the James River" and to oppose them 
at Turkey Island if they should land on his side. The 
militia at Manchester was then ordered to take up posi-
tion at Osborne's and for the militia in Richmond to 
split, with-one half going with Innes at Turkey Island 
and the other half to Long Bridge. Unfortunately, Innes 
was out of his expected position and north of the Pamunkey 
River and on his way toward Richmond.· He had crossed the 
Pamunkey River to counter the British during their forays 
downriver. On April 23 he heard that the British were 
headed for Richmond so he turned in that direction but was 
then unable to return in time. He did not get to Osborne's 
until April 25, too late to oppose the British at Peters-
burg. The forays of the British caused numerous misunder-
standings and uncertainty over where to deploy troops. 
This uncertainty also led to a fear among the Americans 
that improper actions might bring on a repeat of the Brit-
ish invasion in January, when no opposition was presented. 
Compounding this situation was a breakdown in communications--
a possibility that should be avoided in wartime. The final -
result was that for a time on April 23-24, the commanders 
were unaware of everyone's exact location. Innes did not 
know where Steuben or Phillips were; Steuben did not know 
where Innes was. 1 7 
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By the evening of April 23, most intelligence 
had Phillips at Westover and heading for Richmond. · 
By April 24, Steuben himself felt it necessary to enter 
firsthand into the activity. He went to the shore 
opposite Westham and found twenty-three flat-bottomed 
boats and thirteen topsail vessels. While he watched, 
the ships began to move upriver but have Steuben no in-
dication as to which side of the river they intended 
to disembark the troops. When the ships disembarked their 
entire force at City Point in the evening, all doubt 
as to their intentions was finally removed. Steuben's 
prophesy in his plan had been proved to be correct. 
Steuben, as overall military commander, :then made the 
decision to fight. The troops under Steuben with which 
he would oppose the British probably now were down from 
the thirteen hundred to less than one thousand for Steuben, 
in a letter to Greene on April 25 and confirmed by one 
from Jefferson to Washington and from Muhlenberg to 
his brother stated that there were "not more than One 
Thousand men to oppose th~ Enimy advance. 11 18 The force 
probably consisted of some five hundred men, less the 
Isle of Wight and Nansemond militia, who marched to 
Petersburg on April 20. 21 Added to this would be the 
troops and cavalry brought from Chesterfield Courtho.use, 
probably about one hundred. The final addition to the 
army would be the militia who arrived at Petersburg 
or who came from Manchester and Richmond in accordance 
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with Steuben's instructions. Since the militia from 
Richmond and Manchester did not turn out in number and 
those soldiers who did were poorly armed, the bulk 
would have come from militia assembling at Petersburg. 
This number would probably exceed the arms available. 
Since the number of arms given to troops under Muhlenberg 
was about one thousand, this was probably an approxima-
22 tion of the number of troops ready for battle. These 
one thousand troops available to counter Phillips' twenty-
three hundred were an insufficient number to attack ships 
unloading troops. Steuben therefore notified all militia 
and Continental commanders that Blandford, a small settle-
ment between City Point and Petersburg, would be the 
"place of defence and the Bridge of Pokohuntas for our 
retreat. 112 3 
On the morning of April 25, Generals Steuben and 
Muhlenberg with their assembled troops faced the army of 
Generals Phillips and Arnold. The two American generals 
had already mapped out the strategy to be used, and Muh-
lenberg was as prepared as possible. They planned to 
meet the British advance force with an American advance 
force. Once the battle had begun, the lead force would 
retire and be joined by a larger force of troops. They 
would engage the British, then retire and join a still 
larger force. This would continue until all forces had 
entered the conflict and one side or the other left the 
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field. In preparation for the action, Steuben and Muhlen-
berg called for a sufficient amount of rum to be taken 
from the stores or wherever it could be found to give a 
hogshead to each regiment. After it was distributed to 
the troops, they were told to "drink and fill your can-
24· teens . we are going to fight today." -· . Thus forti-
fied, the Americans awaited the conflict. During the 
morning the British approached to within three miles of 
the American lines, and by noon they made their first con-
tact. The British formed their lines and general firing 
began at three' o'clock.· It continued until after five 
o'clock, when "the superior number of the enemy and a 
want of ammunition obliged me to order the retreat, and 
the bridge to be taken up, which was executed in the 
greatest good order. Notwithstanding the fire of the 
enemy's cannon and musketry, the troops ... retreated 
about ten miles on the road leading to Chesterfield 
Courthouse. 1125 
One of Steuben's soldiers, Daniel Trabue, gave 
an account of that afternoon's events: 
Our advance Guard met the army about one mile from 
town. This advance was a Sergeant and 12 men; his 
orders were when he would meet them, to fire when 
they came to 200 paces of them, and then to retreat 
to where they would meet with a larger squad. They 
did so, and met about 100 who had the same orders, 
so these 100 men fired when the Enemy was fully 
200 yards Distant. . . • -
The British fired their cannon, but our men were 
so scattered that it did not cause much Damage, 
while the Enemy's loss was considerable. At length, 
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the British charged on our men, and then retreated 
to where the main Army was. Our men were behind a 
Ware House, a hedge, and Dikes and Fences .•.• ·. 
We left Petersburg when the sun was nearly 2 hours 
high in the evening. I was now 25 miles from home. 
We marched towards where I lived up toward our 
[Chesterfield County] Court House, we went about 7 
miles that night and encamped at dark, where there 
was plenty of wood and water, and all went to cook-
ing and eating.26 · 
On May 6 Jefferson, in writing to General Washing-
ton, stated that the Americans had: 
... disputed the ground very handsomely two hours, 
during which time the enemy gained One mile only, 
and that by inches. Our troops were then ordered 
to retire over a bridge, which they did in perfectly 
good order. Our loss was between sixty and seventy, 
killed, wounded, and taken. The enemy's is unknown; 
but. from circumstances of nrobability it must ha~e 
been·about equal to ours.21 · 
General Muhlenberg, in his account of the battle, stated 
that: 
. . . the enemy approached the town in two columns 
and were met by our light infantry about a mile 
from town, where the skirmish commenced, and every 
inch of ground to the bridge was warmly disputed. • 
At length they cannonaded us so severely, that we 
broke up the bridge and retreated· in the greatest 
regularity~ 8after maintaining the fight for nearly two hour_s. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, in his Journal, listed the 
casualties of the battle as the Americans having been 
"said to have lost near an hundred men killed and wounded, 
while that of the British was only one man killed, and 
ten wounded of the light infantry. 1129, During the main 
part of the battle, the British had only been able to 
advance about one mile toward Blandford Church in two 
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hours. Steuben had placed his cannon on Archer's Hill, 
and from there, covered the skirmish well until over-
matched by numbers. Steuben crossed the river, tore down 
the Pocahontas Bridge, and headed north to Chesterfield 
Courthouse. 
3P 
After crossing the river the morning of April 27, 
Arnold, with the 18th and 76th regiments and Simcoe's 
Rangers, proceeded to Osborne's, where rumor had it that 
numberous stores were located and near which was a marine 
force sent to oppose any additional progress of the British 
fleet up the James River. At the same time, General Phil-
lips marched toward Chesterfield Courthouse. This two-
pronged attack on Chesterfield County was the most de-
structive to date of the war in Virginia. On April 26, 
after the skirmish at Petersburg, Phillips.destroyed some 
"four thousand hogsheads of tobacco, one ship and some 
vessels on the stocks, and in the river. 11 31 
Arnold, with Simcoe and the Queen's Rangers, the 
76th and 80th Regiments, and part of the Yagers marched 
to Osborne's on April 27, arriving about noon. "Finding 
the enemy had very considerable force of ships four miles 
above Osborne's drawn up in a line to oppose us, I sent 
a flag to the commodore, proposing to treat with him for 
the surrender of his fleet, which he refused, with this 
answer, 'that he was determined to defend it to the last 
extremity.' 11 32 ·The British then opened fire from the 
77 
water's edge at a· distance ·of barely one hundred yards. 
Though opposed by fire from several ships and musketry 
from the opposite shore, the British were able to capture 
or sink the entire fleet of Virginia ships. Two ships, 
three brigantines, five sloops, and two schooners loaded 
with tobacco, cordag~ and flour were captured, and four 
ships; five brigantines, and a number of smaller vessels 
were burned or sunk.33 
General Phillips and his troops marched to the 
Continental depot at Chesterfield Courthouse and on 
April 27 and 28, laid waste to all the barracks, ware-
houses, _and shops. They "took what they wanted and 
burned the balance--even the Courthouse they burned. 11 33 
Steuben, in the meantime, just barely had time to remove 
th~ troops to Richmond and to send stores to Point of 
Fork, about forty miles up the James River from Richmond.35 
The Virginia government likewise adjourned to Charlottes-
ville during the emergency. 
General Arnold left Osborne's on April 29 and 
moved up the south b~nk of the river to Ampthill, the 
home of Archibald Cary, five miles west of Richmond.36 
The next day General Arnold rejoined General Phillips 
between Cary's. Mills and· Warwick. Together they marched 
to Manchester, across the river from Richmond. 37 
Steuben, moving just ahead of Phillips, mangged 
to cross the James into Richmond just barely ahead of the 
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British arrival at Manchester. General Lafayette, who 
on April 8 had been ordered to rejoin General Greene 
and aid him in any way possible, had been directed back 
to Virginia to take command in the state, and after mak-
ing forced marches from Head of Elk, he joined Steuben 
in Richmond at about 5 p.m. on Sunday, April 29. 38 
Phillips and Arnold, having destroyed twelve 
thousand hogsheads of tobacco at Manchester, prepared 
to cross into Richmond; but when word came of the arrival 
of General Lafayette the day before, they changed their 
minds. Looking across the river upon their arrival, 
"from whence they had a view of M. Fayette's army en-
camped upon the heights of Richmond . . . [the BritishJ 
wheeled their columns and proceeded back downriver to 
Cary's. 11 39 This was followed by a further movement 
through the settlement of Warwick in Chesterfield County 
to Falling Creek, where it meets the James River. The 
settlement at Warwick, at that time larger than Richmond, 
suffered severe damage when the British put the town to 
the torch. According to General Arnold: 
We.destroyed a magazine of five hundred barrels of 
flour, and Colonel Cary's fine mills were destroyed 
in burning the magazine of flour. We also burnt 
several warehouses, with one hundred and fifty hogs-
heads of tobacco, a large ship and a brigantine 
arloat, and three vessels on the stocks, a large 
range of public ropewalks and storehouses, ~nd some-
tan and bark houses full of hides and bark.· 0 · 
Still in Richmond, collecting and reorganizing 
the scattered militia, Lafayette and Steuben could only 
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watch the destruction to Manchester and Warwick. It was 
only after the British moved on that the American generals 
left Richmond in pursuit. After leaving Warwick, Phillips 
and Arnold proceeded next past Osborne's to Bermuda Hundred, 
where the army embarked on the ships on May 2~ Once em-
barked, the British gave every intention of returning down-
river to Williamsburg or Portsmouth. General Lafayette and 
Baron von Steuben were willing to let them go. The fleet 
proceeded south to the waters off Jamestown, where prepara-
tions were made which gave the impression that the troops 
were landing. This apparently was a feint to confuse the 
Americans. To a degree, it was successful since Lafayette 
and Steuben moved their camp on May 3 to Bottom's Bridge on 
the Chickahominy River, sixteen miles southeast of Richmond. 41 
This change in location gave Lafayette more flexibility to 
move toward Jamestown while still being near enough to 
Richmond to withdraw if Arnold and Phillips returned north. 
On May 6 a boat arriving from Portsmouth came along-
side General Phillips' boat. Immediately after its depar-
ture, the order was given to turn and proceed up the James 
River. The ship had delivered a message from General Corn-
wallis written at Wilmington on April 24 stating his inten-
tion to proceed by land straight north and join Phillips 
and Arnold at Petershurg. The courier stated further that 
Cornwallis had departed Wilmington and was expected to 
arrive on May 6 at Halifax, where he would cross the Roan-
oke River and enter Virginia. 42 
Bo 
The fleet bearing Phillips and Arnold reached 
Brandon's where all the troops but the light infantry 
landed and moved west toward Petersburg. The light in-
fantry continued to City Point, where it disembarked 
and then also moved toward Petersburg. The approach of 
the main British Army, together with the forces of Phil-
lips and Arnold, could have brought great pressure on the 
American forces in Virginia, who could not match in 
experience or provision the British forces.43 Two things, 
however, changed the circumstances of the deployment. 
First General Phillips had been taken ill during the as-
cent back up the James River, with the illness advancing 
swiftly. After May 7 he was rendered incapable of command. 
Secondly, the battle of Cornwallis and Greene at Guilford 
Courthouse had reduced the strength of the British forces 
to the point where reinforcement was necessary. 
Lafayette and Steuben, who had been following the 
British, were forced to retrace their movements. Upon their 
arrival at the James River on May 8, they found that Phil-
lips and Arnold had already entered Petersburg. While at-
tempting to cross the river also, the Americans encountered 
elements of the British right flank which extended all the 
way to the James. During the course of the ensuing clash, men 
in Lafayette's army were said to have cannonaded the British 
lines doing some damage to the house where Phillips lay 
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dying. British authors years later accused Lafayette of 
"inhumanity" for this action, but it is probable that if 
Lafayette had known he was there, no such firing would 
have occurred.44 
Lord Cornwallis, having been met by Lieutenant-
Colonel Simcoe and the Queen's Rangers at the Roanoke 
and told of General Phillips' failing health, marched 
across the Meherrin and Nottaway Rivers, almost straight 
north towards Petersburg. Off to his right marched the 
one hundred eighty cavalry and sixty mounted infantry of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton.45 Arriving in Petersburg 
on May 20, the army was met by Brigadier-General Arnold. 
General Phillips died on May 13, 1781, and was buried in 
an unmarked grave in Blandford cemetary. 
Throughout the Battle of Petersburg and the re-
treat through Chesterfield Courthouse, Steuben was in 
overall command. What kind of commander was he when his 
actions are viewed in retrospect? Whether he was accept-
ing advice from General Muhlenberg or the idea was his 
own, the method of battle used at Petersburg gave him one 
of the best possible chances for success when facing an 
enemy force over twice as large but he did fail to utilize 
a possibility open to him while at City Point before meeting 
the British at Blandford.·- - If he had attacked Arnold. as 
he was disembarking troops, he would have had them at a 
disadvantage. Instead of the ships firing on the Americans, 
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they would not have been able'to employ cannon for fear 
of hitting other ships and their own troops and this 
would have at least given Steuben an added advantage 
later in the day when he had fallen back to Blandford. 
Complete success at City Point would have forced the 
British to abandon the operation and take what men and 
ships remained and returned to Portsmouth. 
After Steuben recrossed the Appomattox River into 
Chesterfield County, there was no natural barrier to the 
British advance. Once again the superiority of the Brit-
ish Army would prohibit Steuben from meeting Phillips on 
equal terms, and he would,have no choice but to retreat 
to Richmond, where the James River provided some security. 
In so doing, however, Chesterfield Courthouse was aban-
doned to the enemy·-_ In S-teuben' s defense, the militia 
had so often retreated when a firm stand would have meant 
victory that it was difficult for a commander to place 
the type of faith in them that would have been required. 
to attack at City Point, fall back to Blandford, re-form 
and attack again. 
The war in Virginia had experienced the caution 
of Arnold and Phillips, who never strayed too far from 
their ships. Virginia's next experience was to be the 
battle-scarred and fast moving warfare of Lord Cornwallis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Road to Yorktown 
With the arrival of Lafayette in Virginia on 
April 29, Steuben was confronted with new challenges. 
Until that time he had been in command of the state 
and Continental forces; then Lafayette was. He still 
had the responsibility to recruit for the Southern Army, 
but one task would be removed. Steuben summed it up 
when he wrote Greene that he: 
. looked upon myself discharged from attending 
the Operations in the field, the more especially 
as he had three Brigadiers under him. I therefore 
again turned my attention to collecting and equip-
ping the Recruits, and, with the Marquis's consent, 1 fixed the general rendezvous at Albemarle Barracks. 
As one of his first actions after the arrival of 
Lafayette, Steuben sought to recover the supplies scat-
tered into the countryside before Phillips' raid on 
Petersburg and Chesterfield County Courthouse; but since 
these locations were not considered particularly safe, 
Steuben, Lafayette, and Jefferson concurred in making 
Albemarle Barracks the new collection point for the re-
cruits. Many Continental supplies were already stored 
there or at the warehouses at Point of Fork, a state depot, 
located in Fluvanna County, about fifteen miles down the 
river from Albemarle Barracks. This area was ideal for 
Steuben's purposes. On May 10 Steuben had moved.his head-
quarters to Charlottesville because it was far enough from 
84 
the scene of the fighting to provide relative safety; it 
was near the homes of some friends; and it was near the 
Virginia government which had moved there May 7. This 
selection was criticized by some vocal Virginians who 
felt that instead of placing his troops in a position~:to 
defend Virginia, Steuben was making it more difficult. 
The threat was from the East instead of the mountains. 
This additional.criticism, which was leveled against him, 
in addition to that resulting from his inability to keep 
Phillips from Petersburg, Chesterfield Courthouse, and 
Manchester, made Steuben even more unhappy in Virginia. 
Steuben was told by Jefferson that fewer troops 
could be expected because many counties had militia in 
the field and so long as they did, the county would not 
draft men for Continental duty. When Steuben asked Jef-
ferson what he believed would be the maximum he could 
receive from counties, he replied that he was confident 
fifteen hundred men could yet be provided. Steuben then 
ordered the men he had already collected to go to Albemarle 
Courthouse to be clothed and armed. At this time Colonel 
Davies wrote him a letter in which he said that Albemarle 
Barracks was a very poor choice for receiving recruits. 
It was difficult to reach by land, had no natural protec-
tion such as woods, and the barracks were nearly destroyed. 
Davies then suggested that the state depot at Po~nt of 
Fork would be much more suitable. After meeting with 
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Lafayette at Wilton and obtaining his concurrence, Steuben 
' ordered his recruits to Point of Fork where they would be 
prepared to join General Greene or General Lafayette as 
needs dictated. Steuben arrived at Point of Fork on May 
20 and spent the next week there and at Albemarle collect-
ing troops and equipment. 2 On May 26 Steuben's troops 
numbered 470 and he wrote Greene that they were ready to 
m~rch and that "I shall be happy if I get off from here 
the 4th or 5th of June • . . I must beg you to determine 
by what route I shall join you."3 Steuben waited for 
instructions, but they did not come. Unfortunately for 
Steuben, they had been intercepted by the British. 4 
On May 24 after only four days rest in Petersburg, 
Cornwallis crossed the James River at Westover and headed 
north after Lafayette. By May 28 the force was sixteen 
miles east of Richmond at Bottom's Bridge; May 29, at New 
Castle; and on May 20, at Hanover Courthouse. Lafayette, 
trying to avoid a direct confrontation until General Wayne 
could get to Virginia and join him, kept retreating. As 
' 
he wrote to General Washington on May 24: 
... was I to fight a battle I'll be cut to pieces, 
the militia dispersed, and the arms lost. Was I to· 
decline fighting the country would think herself 
given up. I am therefore determined to skarmish, 
but not to engage too far, and particularly to take 
care against their immense and excellent body of 
horses whom the militia fears like they would so. 
many wild beasts .... was I any ways equal to the 
ennemy, I should be extremely happy in my present 
command5 But I am not strong enough even to get beaten. 
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Lafayette had another reason for fighting a delay-
ing action. In early April, when Lafayette had received 
his orders to return to Virginia, General Washington had 
also instructed General Anthony Wayne to march his Pennsyl-
vania troops south and join with Lafayette. Wayne, how-
ever, had been delayed by bad weather and discontent over 
a lack of supplies and pay among his troops, as had Lafa-
yette during his.march in April.6 
As the force marched south with a strength df 
eight hundred instead of the fifteen hundred with which 
Wayne had expected to march, doubts began to be raised as 
to whether this detachment could provide the support Lafa-
yette was expecting. Wayne also experienced difficulties 
arising from his efforts to hurry. As·he crossed the Poto-
mac at Georgetown on June 1, his six field pieces fell into 
the river, necessitating a halt. It had rained so hard 
for several days that the army was bogged down, as was 
also the case on June 3 when he was passing Leesburg. 
It was not until June 10 that Wayne was able to join 
Lafayette at Racoon Ford on the Rapidan River.7 
Cornwallis, with Tarleton and Simcoe, watched 
for Wayne's arrival with a c~rtain degree of concern. 
Though his estimated seven thousand troops opposing Lafa-
yette's three thousand gave him more than a two-to-one 
advantage, the British knew that the arrival of Wayne 
with his nine hundred men with Steuben's five hundred 
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would more nearly equalize the armies in strength and 
cause Lafayette to seek the initiative.8 General Corn-
wallis therefore formulated a plan in which he dispatched 
Tarleton and his 180 dragons with 70 mounted infantry in 
support, to "proceed .•. before daybreak tomorrow to 
Old Albemarle Courthouse, where you will destroy any 
stores you may find. If you find no other stores of any 
consequence ...• you will cross •.• [the Rivanna] and 
strike a blow at Baron Steuben."9 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Simcoe, with three hundred men of the Queen's Rangers, 
with two hundred of the 7lst Regiment w~~ sent directly 
to Point of Fork_ to oppose Steuben on June 2, 1781. · 
Tarleton moved the seventy miles to Charlottes-
ville in only forty-eight hours and attacked there on 
June 4. Luck was with.the assembly as Jack Jouett, .rid--
ing ahead of Tarleton, was able to warn nearly every 
delegate. With little time to spare, all but seven mem-
bers were able to escape west over the mountains to 
Staunton. 10 Though unable to capture the assembly, Tarle-
ton did destroy a thousand flintlocks, four hundred barrels 
of powder, clothing, tobacco, and such public records as 
could be found. 11 Having completed his mission in Char-
lottesville, Tarleton turned south with his prisoners and 
marched toward Point of Fork to rejoin Lieutenant-Colonel 
Simcoe. 
At five o'clock on June 3, Steuben received word 
that a British force moving up the river was approaching' -
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from the direction of Goochiand Courthouse. Anticipating 
that these troops were intent on attacking Point· of Fork, 
Steuben put aside for the moment his preparations to join 
General Greene and feverishly began removing all the 
stores across the James River. Guards were posted to warn 
of the arrival of any British troops, and the supplies, 
food, and arms were loaded onto boats and canoes and along 
with the troops transferred to the south side of the river. 
During the day General Robert Lawson arrived with some 
two.hundred fifty militia who were also put to work. By 
evening almost all the Continental stores had been moved 
when Colonel Davies arrived to oversee the movement of 
the Virginia state supplies. With everyone working, the 
remaining' supplies were moved across and put on wagons or 
set on the shore. By early on the morning of June 4, vir-
tually all supplies and troops had been transported across 
the river. Only about thirty men remained on the north 
side when the British appeared. 12 
Moving rapidly, Simcoe covered the last four miles 
to Point of Fork in about two hours, arriving at noon on 
June 4. Simcoe had been very careful in his approach to 
.avoid detection by capturing or detaining everyone with 
whom the troops came in contact. As a result, he was able 
to capture the troops who remained in the camp. He was 
also able to prevent Steuben from knowing the size force 
\ which came. Simcoe saw that Steuben had already crossed 
the river but that quantities of supplies were still sitting 
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on the shore.~ He decided upon a ruse to make Steuben 
think Cornwallis had arrived with his entire army, 
believing that in so doing, Steuben might abandon the 
supplies and retreat into the countryside. During the 
day Simcoe sent the scarlet-clad troops of the 7lst Regi-
ment into the camp with a three-pounder cannon with instruc-
tions to fire one accurate shot across the river at Steuben. 
They were then to begin building rafts to cross the river. 
The remainder of Simcoe's troops were to spread out, 
remain under the cover of the woods, and at dark build 
sufficient numbers of campfires to give the impression of 
a large force. 13 
·All of this activity,,when coupled with the intel-
ligence furnished by some of his staf~ had the desired 
effect on Steuben. While he actively worked to remove 
those supplies and troops he could to a safer location, 
such as Albemarle Barracks, he nevertheless decided soon 
after dark to abandon what was left and to leave Point of 
Fork without confronting Simcoe and to move on to Willis 
Creek. 14 
The fol~owing morning Simcoe, pleased that his 
efforts had been successful, sent a detachment of light 
..,,..-
infantry across with saddles and instructions to destroy 
the supplies on the shore. Then they were to mount what-
ever available horses could be found and actively pursue 
Steuben far enough to give him the idea that the ·whole 
British army was behind him. 15 
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' Estimates of the losses in supplies iesulting from 
the British attack varied. Simcoe's estimate was that: 
... two thousand five hundred stand of arms, a large 
quantity of gunpowder, case shot, &c., several casks 
of saltpetre, sulfur, and brimstone, and upwards of 
sixty hogsheads of rum and brandy, several chests of 
carpenters' tools and upwards of four hundred intrench-
ing tools, with casks of flints, sail cloth and wag-
gons, and a great variety of small stores ..... There 
were taken off, a thirteen-inch mortar, five brass 
eight-inch howitzers, and four long brass nine-poundel6, 
... all French pieces and in excellent order. . . . · 
The Continental storekeeper, taking inventory after the 
raid, estimated the losses as: 
.. 68 boxes of coarse cloths, 60 pair of leather 
breeches, 1 small bale linen--2,000 yards Canvass, 1 
Hhd Checks soldiers hatts, 1 box containing linen 
and Coarse thread, 2 small bales of Blankets contain-
ing about 75, 2 Hogsheads of Coffee, and 1 small.case 
of Tea.17 
When these totals were given to the Virginia delegates, 
they were outraged. To them, Steuben had once more demon-
strated his disregard for Virginia's well-being. 
As Steuben moved away from Point of Fork, he added 
still more fuel to the fires of critici~m levied by the 
Virginia government officials. On June 5 a letter had 
been written to Governor Nash of North Carolina requesting 
supplies be provided to support the troops he was taking 
south to the Southern Army. Steuben sent the dispatch 
with a Captain Kirkpatrick, who arrived in North Carolina 
/- . 
on Friday, June 8. Steuben, meanwhile, left Willis.Creek 
and continued south to Prince Edward Old Courthouse, then 
to Charlotte Courthouse, arriving on June 9. Here, in a 
letter to General Greene, he stated his intention to march 
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south and join the Southern Army in accordance with his 
orders bringing with him five hundred fifty recruits 
and informed Greene that he had left General Lawson with 
six hundred militia to counter the British. 1 8 Upon his 
arrival at Granville, North Carolina, Captain Kirkpatrick 
found that Governor Abner Nash was not preseht ·so he de-
livered the request to General Jethro Sumner. Sumner 
indicated his willingness to support Steuben's request but 
told Kirkpatrick that it was surprising news to hear Steu-
ben was moving south when he had orders from General Greene 
to bring the new Carolina levies and march north to Virginia 
if Cornwallis entered the state. Kirkpatrick immediately 
sent the information Sumner had given him back to Steuben, 
who received it on June 10. Steuben halted his march at 
Cole's Ferry on the Staunton (Roanoke) River to await in-
structions from either Greene or Lafayette. 19 
During all this time, public outcry had grown over 
the loss of supplies at Point of Fork and was growing still 
more over· ~teuben's apparently precipitate departure south-
ward. Steuben ~as by no means oblivious to these develop-
ments, but for some days he remained at Cole's Ferry hoping 
word would come from _Greene. During this wait, Steuben 
addressed himself to the militia in southwestern Vi~ginia 
I 
in a circular letter. Addressed to the county lieutenants 
of Prince Edward, Cumberland, and Amelia Courthouses, 
which had been established as places of rendezvous for 
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recruits since Chesterfield Courthouse and Point of Fork 
had been destroyed, Steuben entreated everyone to: 
••• get together every man in your county, who can 
possibly be armed •••• If we succeed in collecting 
such a body of militia as can offer resistance to the 
enemy, I have not the least doubt that we shall not 
only preserve this part of the State from their depre-
dation, but that in a short t~~e they will be driven 
back to their shipping. • • • 
On June 13 Steuben received a letter from Lafay-
ette: 
I request you, my dear sir, that you will immediately 
return this way, and with the Continentals and mili-
tia under your command, hasten to form a junction with 
us. I am afraid General Greene's letter requesting 
you to remain with us has not yet got to hand, but 
unless you have received orders· subsequent ••. I can 
assure you his desire was then to form a junction.21 
Though Steuben still had not received word from General 
Greene, he now had definite indications that he was to 
remain in Virginia. Steuben left Cole's Ferry on June 12 
after he received the information from Sumner and proceeded 
to Prince Edward Courthouse arriving there on June 13. He 
then received Lafayette's letter. With definite instruc-
tions, Steuben crossed Carter's Ferry June 16 and marched 
across Goochland County. On June 19 Steuben safely re-
joined Lafayette in Hanover County at Colonel Dandridge's. 22 
General Wayne had also joined Lafayette on June 10 so the 
American army had become a formidable force of some four 
thousand men. The four American generals--Lafayette, 
Wayne, Muhlenberg, and Steuben--watched intently to see 
what Cornwallis' next move would be. To their su~prise, 
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he moved back through Richmond on June 21 and continued 
back down the north side of the James River. Going first 
to Bottom's Bridge, then to .New Kent Courthouse on June 22, 
he slowly made his way toward Yorktown and Williamsburg 
by June 25. 23 The reason behind this move was a direc-
tive from General Clinton, Commander of British forces in 
America, for Cornwallis to fortify a position in Virginia 
and then to send the remaining troops to New York. Clinton 
believed that the growing strength of French and Americans 
around New York placed his army in danger. Even if it did 
not, he wanted to launch a campaign against Philadelphia 
and the Virginia troops would aid him considerably. 24 
Along the route of march, there were several . 
instances when the American troops in their eagerness 
formed to do battle with the British, only to be disap-
pointed. One occasion happened on June 18, the day before 
Steuben joined the army near a place called Meadow Bridge, 
., 
located on the Ch~ckahominy almost due north of Richmond. 
General Muhlenberg, in the advance, was pressing Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Tarleton from the rear. During the course of 
the march, he approached too clo~ely and was met by an 
element of the British Cavalry. By the time the Americans 
could form, the British had moved off without any serious 
engagement. Two members of the First Pennsylvania Regi-
ment, a Captain John Davis and Lieutenant William Felt-
man, made virtually the same observation when they left 
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camp at sunset to surprise a "party of Tarleton's horse 
• • • • continued to daylight, but on our arrival found 
they were gone some hours •.•• (traveled) 13 miles. 1125 
After this false alarm, the march after Cornwallis was 
resumed. On June 22 the Americans came to Richmond. 
Much of the city still lay in rubble as a result of the 
British attacks, but there was enough activity to allow 
Captain Davis and Lieutenant Feltman the opportunity to 
go to town for the purpose of "playing billiards and 
d .nk. . ,26 ri ing wine.' 
From June 2J-26 the Americans proceeded east to 
the Pamunkey, then south toward Spencer's Ordinary just 
northwest of Williamsburg following the army of Corn-. 
wallis. On June 26 the advance guard, under Colonel 
Richard Butler, arrived at Spencer's Ordinary while La-
fayette, Steuben, and the rest of the army remained 
encamped at Bird's Tavern. A British force under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Simcoe, returning from a night-foraging 
march, ran into Butler's force at Spencer's Ordinary. 
The Americans charged Simcoe's men and then fell back to 
allow the riflemen to press the advantage. The British 
gave way under the attack with losses reported by General 
Cornwallis of thirty-five and by the Americans of nine 
dead, fourteen wounded. Following the confrontation, 
both sides claimed victory; the Americans were left in 
possession of the field and the strategic advantage. 27 
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General Cornwallis continued his movement toward Ports-
mouth while the American army, remaining a safe distance 
away, followed along behind. On June 28 Cornwallis was in 
Williamsburg while the American army rested at Tyree's 
Plantation twenty miles northwest of Williamsburg. On 
July 4, 1781, Cornwallis began to move his troops from 
28 Williamsburg to Portsmouth. 
From there would come the decislon to move to 
Yorktown, where the British army in Virginia met its de-
feat. Steuben had no role in this part of the conflict. 
The fatigue of the marches, the conflicts between Steuben 
and the state, and the worries over support for his army 
had climaxed in an illness which removed Steuben from. the 
battlefield from about July 2 until September 3, 1781. 
The seriousness of the illness and the pain and 
discomfort it caused were excellent reasons for Steuben 
to think only of his recovery. Unfortunately, many peo-
ple and the Assembly of Virginia had become thoroughly 
disgusted with what they felt were the errors in judgment 
demonstrated by Steuben at Point of Fork. In the days 
immediately following the event, public outcry against 
Steuben grew to exceptional heights. Even Lafayette, who 
knew the problem of field command, wrote his personal 
feelings to General Washi_ngton on June 18: 
The conduct of the Baron, my dear General, is to me 
unintelligible--Every man woman and child in Virginia 
is roused against him. They dispute even on his 
96 
courage but I cannot believe their assertions. I 
must however confess that he had 500 and odds new 
levies, and militia, that he was on the other side 
of the river which the freshet rendered very diffi-
cult to be crossed .•• the greater part of the· 
accounts made Simcoe 400 strong; that our stores 
were destroyed by 30 or 40 men ••• that the Baron 
went to Staunton River about 70 miles from the Point 
of Fork--that the militia abandonned him and ••• 
the new levies deserted from him because they did 
not like his maneuver.29 
Later, however, after hearing Steuben's account 
of the affair, Lafayette would change his belief and 
would state that "the Lordship did us no harm of any 
consequence" at Point of Fork.JO It was learned, for 
instance, that the muskets referred to were arms needing 
repair, not new ones. Davies also reported that the 
clothing and supplies had been moved to Staunton. Only 
remnants of needed items were abandoned and of those that 
were left behind, most belonged to state rather than Con-
tinental forces. Furthermore, he stated on June 23: 
The Assembly were at first much mortified at the 
losses we had sustained by the rapid incursions of 
the enemy, and in their discontent were really clam-
orous; they moderate in their vexation, as they have 
since found that the mischief done by the enemy was 
inconsiderable compared with the· plunder of the in- Jl 
habitants, of whom we expect to recover a great deal. 
The damage was done, however, and the dislike and dis-
trust between Virginia and Steuben grew even stronger. 
In the course of days which followed, Steuben gave the 
following as an explanation of his actions: 
I could not see what could hinder the enemy from 
detaching a sufficient party to disperse my force 
and render themselves master of the stores • ·• • 
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I thought it to be absurd ~aking a bravado with 
a small number of bad troops against such a force, 
while the marquis, being near one hundred miles 
off, could make no diversion on that side. I, 
therefore, gave orders for dispersing the stores 
in such a manner that only part could fall into 
the enemy's hands on any route they could take, 
and sent off three officers successively to ac-
quaint the marquis of my situation. I wrote cir-
cular letters to the county lieutenants to call 
on their militia, and leaving General Lawson at 
Charlotte Courthouse, I marched the recruits to 
Cole's Ferry, on the Stanton.32 , 
In May 1781, after the events at Point of Fork, 
the House of Delegates passed a resolution: 
That the Honorable Major General Marquis La Fayette 
be requested to cause an inquiry to be made into the 
conduct of all persons under his command, who may be 
supposed, either by neglect or otherwise, to have 33 been instrumental in the loss of the said stores. 
If this resolution had meant only what it said, 
the investigation would have either been made, Steuben 
absolved of blame, and the matter forgotten; or Steuben 
would have been found responsible and given a rebuke. It 
would not be the first time a military officer or even a 
general had been investigated for alleged improprieties. 
This inquiry, however, was the culmination of a series 
of disagreements over policy, tactics, and motivation. 
Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the House of Delegates, wrote 
to Joseph Jones, a Virginia delegate in Congress on June 
8, 1781: 
We have 600 fine men under Baron Steuben which he will 
not carry into action. What are his reasons, I know 
not, but I can assure you his Conduct gives universal 
disgust and injures the Service much, the People com-
plaining and with reason that they are draged from 
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their Families at a time when they are most wanted 
to make bread for them, whilst the Soldiers they have 
hired at very great expense lay Idle. In short my Dr. 
Sir, his conduct does great mischief and will do more 
if he is not recalled, and I think it behoves you to 
bring it about. I assure you it is the wish and de-
sire of every man that this Event should take place. 
I believe him a good officer on the Parade, but the 
worst in every other respect in the American Army.34 
Archibald Cary, Speaker of the Senate, had also 
written to Jefferson on June 19, 1781 that some three 
members of the council had observed that ". 
deserves to be h~nged for his Conduct.'11 35 
• • Steuben 
This was the final straw. In summarizing and evalu-
ating Steuben's actions from his point of view, it had been 
disturbing when Virginia officials, upset by Arnold's free-
dom of movement and Steuben's lack of opposition in January 
had heaped criticism on Steuben and the army. In March, the 
inability of the Americans to capture Arnold at Portsmouth, 
even with Lafayette, again brought criticism to the army. 
Then when the Virginia government disapproved, on March 29, 
his plan to take two thousand troops southward to attack 
Cornwallis, he returned the criticism by openly question-
ing the motives of the Virginia authorities. This sudden 
disapproval of the plan when approval had seemed certain 
because Generals Lafayette, Weedon, Gouvion, Greene, 
Washington, and Lee had given their concurrence, led 
Steuben to the conclusion that the government and the 
chief executive were making this a matter of personai 
rebuke. When Phillips and Arnold invaded and destroyed 
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Osborne's, Chesterfield County, and Warwick, Steuben was 
praised with Muhlenberg for the resistance given to the 
British. Soon, however, the critics again became vocal 
and stated their beliefs that no matter how many Americans 
could be put against the British, they would be unable to -
defend the state from destruction. 
Steuben was also frustrated and upset when accused 
of not having Virginia's interests at heart in his deci-
sions as military commander. The Virginia officials made 
no secret that they felt his actions were often dictated 
by a desire to leave Virginia for the South and take all 
manpower and materiel resources with him when he went. 
Finally, with the resolution requesting an investigation 
of his actions at Point of Fork, Steuben lost his remain-
ing patience and consideration for the Virginia government. 
The unfortunate part of the alienation was that 
the greater part of the accusations and counteraccusa-
tions by both the Virginia officials and Steuben were mis-
understandings and a somewhat natural desire to find some-
thing or someone else upon whom to affix blame. As time 
passed and further information became available, each 
point of disagreement was cleared. Those losses the Vir-
ginia authorities laid· so quickly at Steuben's feet were, 
when the facts of the bat~les were made known, brought 
on by other underlying causes--lack of arms, untrained 
militia, and ineffective intelligence. Steuben's.main 
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faults lay in the area of inexperience and an excess of 
caution. The damage was done. Everything Steuben had 
undertaken had either been unsuccessful, criticized, or 
misinterpreted. Once the seed of doubt had been placed 
in people's minds, the facts could easily be arranged to 
suit the point of view. While Steuben felt his actions 
had been reasonable under the circumstances and the Vir-
ginia officials were incorrect or too hasty in the evalu-
ation, the Virginians held quite an opposing viewpoint. 
As this doubt grew in both camps, so did each 
side's provocations and accusations, thereby creating 
more ill-will. As early as April but certainly by mid-
June, Steuben was convinced that his usefulness was a.t an 
end. His disputes with the officers of both the militia 
and the Continental line as well as his conflicts with the 
Virginia governmental authorities had alienated many 
people. It was perhaps only his illness in July that 
kept him in Virginia and permitted him to play a part. 
in the siege of Yorktown. 
' ":"•.--.~ •Y 
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yHAPTER VII 
Yorktown 
During the first few days of July 1781, Baron von 
Steuben became progressively ill, when, as Steuben described 
it: 
Fatigue of body and mind and the hot climate, so 
unfavorable for my bilious temperament, have so 
affected my health, that about two weeks ago, I 
was obliged to withdraw and take treatment for a 
skin eruption which became quite serious •..• an 
eruption of blood, which covered my whole body.l 
Steuben, following the onset of the illness, took 
leave of Lafayette and traveled to the home of friends 
made during his travels in northwestern Virginia. In his 
letters he tells of staying at a country house near ~Mr. 
(John) Walker's whom you (Greene) met at Philadelphia, a 
member of Congress and his father, who is my physician. 112 
Dr. Thomas Walker, father of John Walker, lived 
at an estate called Castle Hill in Albemarle County, Vir-
ginia. The ~state was located on the main road from 
Keswick to Gordonsville in the northern part of the county. 
This estate, then comprised of some eleven thousand acres 
of land, had originally been land granted by George II to 
Nicholas Meriwether. Upon the birth of the Walker chil-
dren, the main estate was subdivided into the estates of 
Turkey Hill, Peachlorum, Belvoir, and Kinloch. John 
Walker owned the estate of Belvoir, which was located 
about four miles southeast of Castle Hill. Built on the 
original grant also was Grace Church and a small village 
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consisting of Shay's store, Bowle's Shop, and an ordin-
ary. 
Steuben had first met John Walker while he served 
as a representative to the Continental Congress in Phila-
delphia. On a number of occasions between October 1780 
and July 1781, Steuben had been at Castle Hill for visits 
with the Walkers and it was here to this complex of es-
tates that Steuben came when illness caused him to seek a 
quiet, safe haven--a haven far removed from the ravages 
of war and the Virginia government--where he could rest 
and, at the same time, receive medical help.3 
There are few letters written by Steuben from 
early July until late August, most probably because of 
the severity of his condition. There are, however, a 
number of letters to him with instructions to recruit 
Continental troops or requesting advice. One of these was 
a letter on July 12 from General Daniel Morgan telling 
Steuben that.Lafayett~ wanted him to take action to obtain 
items of equipment for the cavalry. On July 16 Baron von 
Steuben replied: 
Colonel White has just handed me your letter of 
the 12th instant. 
You must certainly, Sir, have misunderstood the 
Marquis, as he knows that I am here for the re-
covery of my health and not for the purpose of 
equipping the cavalry. Major (Richar~) Call has 
the superintendance of that business. 
During this period of pain and idleness, Steuben once 
more turned his thoughts to General Greene and the 
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Southern Army. On July 23, 1781, in a letter to his long-
time friend, Richard Peters, he poured out his frustra-
tions: 
I have seen so many atrocous villanies since I have 
been in this state that I can no longer be surprised 
at anything. (In regard to my actions at Point of 
Fork) • . . I will be forced to expose the dastardli-
ness of the government, the absurdity of the law, and 
the pusillanimity of those who should have executed 
them. • • . When my health is restored, I intend to 
once again join the southern army.5 
In August, however, his ~ealth steadily improved and by 
mid-month he was able to write to General Greene that: 
I have received your favor of the 19th of July, in 
which I am ordered to join you. If it had pleased 
God, my dear General, that this order had reached 
me some months sooner, I should have escaped a great 
deal of pain and chagrin. • • • My duty and inclina-
tion would have engaged me to set out immediatej.y on 
the receipt of your letter, had not my ill health 
prevented me. • • • The heat of the season, uneasi-
ness of mind, and a thousand other things have so 
used me up that I cannot yet sustain the fatigue of 
a journey. I shall, however, prepare to ta~e up my 
line of march the last of this month •••. 
Though Steuben's illness forced him to leave the 
army for Ch~rlottesville, the main American army, which 
then consisted of 4,155 troops, with Colonel Christian 
Febiger in command of Steuben's troops, continued to 
pursue Cornwallis toward Portsmouth.7 Along the way two 
skirmishes, the battles of Spencer's Ordinary and Green 
Spring Farm, occurred. These battles delayed the arrival 
of Cornwallis' army in Portsmouth until July 14. Corn-
wallis was returning to Portsmouth in preparation for 
sending troops for the reinforcement of General Clinton's 
army. He had learned in May from dispatches that General 
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Clinton planned an attack on: Philadelphia us~ng troops 
from New York and Virginia. As originally envisioned, 
the Virginia troops would advance up the Chesapeake to 
Head of Elk, then march overland toward Philadelphia. 
General Phillips, who was to lead the expedition had 
approved of the plan contingent upon being given two 
thousand more men. Clinton agreed and sent eighteen 
hundred men to Virginia who arrived about the same time 
Cornwallis came to Petersburg. When Cornwallis took com-
mand, he heard of the proposed campaign, but disagreed 
with the idea entirely, even though it had previously 
been approved. In fact, Cornwallis wrote a letter on May 
26 voicing strong opposition to the plan and stating:that 
11if offensive war is intended, Virginia appears to be the 
only province in which it can be carried on, and in which 
there is a stake. 11 8 
Clinton, however, would not be dissuaded from his 
plan of action. When Cornwallis completed his· campaign in 
Virginia, he received a letter on July 8, repeating the 
request for troops. Following its receipt, Cornwallis 
moved to Portsmouth to comply with Clinton's order.9 The 
troops embarked on July 20 but did not sail as planned, 
for Cornwallis received another letter from Clinton dated 
July 8, which stated that he had no intention of imposing 
his will over that of Cornwallis and that he would accept 
Cornwallis' decisions. 10 By July 26 Lord Cornwallis, 
in a letter sent to Admiral Thomas Graves, Commander of 
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the British fleet the stage for the siege of Yorktown 
was set. 
• • • the Commander-in-Chief having signified to 
me that he thought a secure harbor • • • of so 
much importance in the Chesapeake, that he wished 
me to possess one •••• I shall immediately siege 
and fortify the ports of York and Glouchester.ll 
On August 2 Cornwallis sailed for Yorktown and began the 
task of fortifying the town and the surrounding area. 
General Washington had likewise begun to make 
plans. As early as May 21, he had met with Rochambeau 
at Wethersfield, New York, to discuss a joint operation 
against the British, probably at New York. Final prepa-
rations required only a strong French fleet to guard the 
seaward front. On June 13 the final piece fell in place 
when Admiral de Grasse announced his fleet would arrive 
• 'Am • t . "d 12 1n er1can wa ers 1n mi -summer. 
While planning the campaign against New York, 
Washington also received numerous letters from Virginia 
informing him of the progress of Cornwallis' campaign in 
Virginia, but Washington felt Clinton was closer and his 
defeat would insure victory. On August 14, 1781, a fate-
ful letter from Admiral de Grasse informed Rochambeau and 
Washington that his vessels would sail directly for Chesa-
peake Bay and not New York. Early in August Washington 
knew of the occupation of Yorktown by Cornwallis. A fleet 
to protect the seaward front presented the opportunity. 
Washington wanted. The scene of the campaign shifted 
~apidly from New York to Virginia. 13 Washington and 
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Rochambeau then requested Admiral the Comte de Barras to 
bring his fleet to join that of de Grasse. These two to-
gether would be stronger than anything the British could 
send. 14 
General Washington, with his army, broke camp at 
Dobb's Ferry on August 19 and marched toward a junction 
with Lafayette. Washington's progress toward Virginia 
was steady but since he was moving to avoid detection by 
the British, it was not particularly direct or rapid. 
Arriving at Williamsburg on the 14th, Washington had an 
army of some two thousand men made up of infantry from 
New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, with Hazen's Regi-
ment, Rhode Island's Regiment, and a regiment of art~llery 
t6 use in the coming siege. Also marching south to join 
this relatively small force was another formidable army 
of four thousand under General the Comte de Rochambeau. 15 
The real concern of the generals was that since 
the plans _ha? been set in motion, Cornwallis must not be 
allowed to escape before the armies could merge against 
him. General Washington wrote on August 21 to Lafayette 
that it would be his responsibility to insure that Corn-
wallis did not move from Yorktown before he could arrive. 16 
General Lafayette moved his troops under Generals 
Wayne and Muhlenberg to carry out their orders. Wayne was 
sent south of the James River to guard the south bank and 
the roads leading southward, and Lafayette with Muhlenberg 
moved along the north bank of the James to Holt's Forge. 
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On September 1, Lafayette wrote Washington that the French 
fleet had arrived and that: 
I hope you will find we have taken the best precau-
tions to lessen His Lordship's chances to escape--
He has a few left but so very precarious that I 
hardly believe he will make the attempt--if he does 
he must give up Ships, Artillery Baggage part of the 
Horses all the Negroes--He must be certain to lose 
the third of his Army •••• ~7 
After the arrival of the Comte de Grasse, Lafayette dis-
patched a letter on September 3 to Steuben, informing him 
that the French fleet with a corps of thirty-three hundred 
troops under the Marquis de St. Simon was in the bay and 
that "he would be charmed to see me at his headquarters 
at once. 1118 Whether it was a desire to become involved 
in a new action against the British or an apprehensio? that 
to leave Virginia and move south would only further damage 
his reputation, Steuben wrote to Greene: 
I beg you, my dear General, to permit my assisting 
this expedition which is preparing. Considering 
how small the number of your troops is, :1r think my 
presence may be dispensed with for some time; never-
theless, if you judge it necessary and should you 
think tne motives which induce me to stay insuffi-
cient, the moment I receive your commands, I shall 
begin my journey. Tomorrow I shall join the Marquis. 
I shall give him every assistance in my power.19 
Once he was in Williamsburg, Steuben reported to 
General Lafayette but did not see him since the marquis 
was ill and unable to see anyone. Nevertheless, when 
a meeting did take place, Lafayette accepted his offer 
and together the generals awaited the arrival of General 
Washington. While they were waiting St. Simon and de 
Grasse approached Lafayette with the suggestion that it 
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was pointless to wait for the arrival of Washington since 
St. Simon had thirty-one hundred soldiers and eight cannon, 
while de Grasse also offered eighteen hundred sailors for 
Lafayette's use against Cornwallis. Though this offer was 
tempting, Lafayette refused, suggesting that a "frontal 
assault on prepared fortifications would be very costly in 
lives, especially without the aid of siege artillery and 
might possibly be a failure. 1120 
When Washington arrived at Williamsburg on Septem-
ber 14, he found Steuben hard at work again on the drill 
field. 21 By September 25 all Continental and French troops 
were on hand and Washington had designated, along with his 
two other senior generals, Benjamin Lincoln and Lafayette, 
Baron von Steuben as a division commander. To quote Gen-
eral Washington: 
••• The Baron from the warmth of his temper, had 
got disagreeably involved with the state (of Vir-
ginia) and an inquiry into a part of his conduct 
must one day take place, both for his own honor 
and their satisfaction. I have for the present 
given him a command in this army which makes him 
happy •. • .22 
On September 28 the combined armies moved to within two 
miles of Yorktown. Steuben's division, located in the 
center, had the French to his left and first Lafayette 
then Lincoln, occupying the position of honor, to his 
right. His division was deployed along the Warwick 
Courthouse Road, almost due south of Yorktown. His 
force consisted of two brigades, sappers, miners and 
a few recruits from Delaware. The First Brigade under 
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Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania had 275 
men in the First Battalion (Pennsylvania) under Colonel 
Walter Stewart, 275 men in the Second Battalion (Pennsyl-
vania) under Colonel Richard Butler, and 3.50 men in the 
Virginia Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Gas-
kins. The Second Brigade was under the command of Briga-
dier General Mordecai Gist of Maryland. His·brigade con-
sisted of the .5.50 men in the Third Regiment (Maryland) 
under Lieutenant~Colonel Commandant Peter Adams and 450. 
men f'r:om the Fourth Regimen·t (Maryland) under . the c omfuand 
. . . 
of Alexander Rexburg •. In support were .50 miners and sap-
pers and 60 Delaware Recruits under Captain William Mc-
Kennan. Of the total 2010 troops,. approximately 617 were 
sick or unfit.for duty as the· siege began. 23 
In addition to this command, Steuben also acted 
as advisor.on siege warfare. He was the only American 
officer who had ever taken part in a regular siege; 
therefore, when the necessity arose to consult and act in 
common with the French staff, Steuben acted to insure the 
Americans were fairly and equitably participating in the 
action. Steuben also was undoubtedly consulted when Gen-
eral Washington drew up his instructions for the conduct 
of siege operations since Washington had never partici-
pated in this type of warfare before. 24 
By September 29 the combined American and French 
armies, totaling some sixteen thousand soldiers, .had 
moved into place around Yorktown. The engineers, having 
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examined the topography; of the area, had briefed the divi-
sion commanders on where and how each should locate their 
lines. 25 Once in place, all of the divisions including 
Steuben and his troops spent the time preparing for the 
siege. On September JO Steuben was officer of the day and 
therefore responsible for overseeing offensive preparations. 
During the course of his tour, two spectators were killed 
while they were moving about observing the British. Fear-
ful of the safety of other spectators, Steuben issued 
orders that no one except those required to do so, were 
allowed to check out the enemy lines. 26 His troops mean-
while, along with the French and anyone who could be put 
to the task were busy making gabions, fascines, and stakes 
as well as offloading and bringing up the cannon. 27 
During the first few days of October, the fire 
from the British lines was quite intense. On the nights 
of October 1 and 2 General Wayne, one of Steuben's bri-
gade commanders, along with his troops manned the American 
lines. During his period of duty the firing was particu-
larly severe with not only the cannon in the city but the 
ships firing as well. By_ the end of Wayne's duty at sun-
down on October 2, the British had expended 351 rounds. 
Once Wayne was relieved of this duty, he rejoined Steuben 
and the rest of the division moving the American cannon 
to the fortifications. 
By October J, Steuben had been presented With one 
more worry. He had received instructions to prevent any 
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of his troops from visiting any houses in the vicinity 
since almost everyone was infected with smallpox or some 
other illness. 28 On October 4 General Wayne advised 
Steuben that two deserters he had encountered while check-
ing new British defenses along the York River had reported 
extensive illness in Yorktown with two thousand of the 
British troops being hospitalized. 29 
Throughout October 5 the preparation of the breast-
works and positioning of cannon continued. Finally, every-
thing along the American and French lines was in readiness. 
On October 6, the siege officially began for the combined 
armies with the opening of the first parallel. Steuben, 
again officer of the day, joined by his inspector Major 
William Galvan, oversaw the preparations being made.JO 
Lincoln, the senior major-general, was designated to lead 
the ceremony opening the parallel. With Lincoln were six 
regiments selected from the right side of each brigade and 
two brigadier-generals, Clinton and Wayne. At six o'clock 
in the evening, Steuben watched as Lincoln with the Ameri-
cans and Baron de Viomenil with the French formed the line. 
There were four thousand three hundred in all--fifteen hun-
dred to do the digging and twenty-eight hundred to act as 
gurars.Jl 
During the first night, little firing was directed 
toward the troops. By morning a long trench ran from near-
ly the center of the enemy's fortifications at a distance 
of about five hundred fifty yards all the way to the York 
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River. Supporting it would be four redoubts, two in the 
French area and two in the American, and five batteries. 
Also, On October 6, General Washington issued General 
Orders with the fifty-five siege instructions. Because of 
Steuben's experience with siege warfare, it is most prob-
able that he advised Washington on the procedures or even 
assisted in writing them. This is especially likely when 
considering the relative inactivity of Steuben during the 
first few days of October. The next day, October 7, was 
spent with reinforcing and strengthening the parallel so 
that the artillery so badly needed would be mounted. On 
this day Lafayette entered the trenches "with the tread of 
veterans, colors flying, drums beating, and planted their 
standards upon the parapet ... 32 The siege was underway in 
earnest. 
On October 8 Steuben's division manned the trenches. 
In so doing, he preserved the order in which each general's 
troops took the trenches on a rotating basis of once every 
three days. Steuben and his troops would next have the 
duty October 11, then the 14th and finally the 17th. This 
rotation was also followed for assigning details for fatigue 
duty.33 
Steuben's responsibility on this day was the com-
pletion of the trenches and the fortifications for the 
cannon. Difficult though this was, Steuben was able.to 
take his first day in the trenches and turn it into a 
lesson in siege warfare for the other senior officers 
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present • 
• . • the general of the trenches enJoins it in the 
strictest manner, on the officers to remain with 
their respective commands. The officers commanding 
platoons are, particularly during the night, to keep 
their men together, with their arms in their hands. 
In case the enemy should sally, the whole of the 
troops are to form eight paces in the rear of the 
trench; and as the enemy came into the trench, the 
respective platoons will rush on them with the bayo-
net; when they are repulsed and retiring, then, and 
not before, the troops will occupy ~he banquette, 
and fire at them in their retreat.3~ 
During the day his division was successful in completing 
a large battery on the extreme right of the parallel, 
located on the York River. This battery contained_ three 
twenty-nine pounders, three eighteen pounders, two ten-
inch mortars, and two eight-inch howitzers. Simultan-
eously the French completed another battery similar to 
Steuben's on the left end. These two batteries combined 
with a third in the center and a smaller one on the left 
and right of center were ready for use when Steuben was 
relieved by General Lincoln on October 9. At 3 p.m. 
General Washington is said to have fired the first cannon, 
whereupon the French and American batteries began to re-
turn the fire they had so incessantly received from the 
British since the investment began.35 It is not known 
exactly whether Washington fired from the French or Ameri-
can battery, but the fire which followed silenced many 
British guns. Some of the fire was aimed at British war-
ships sitting in the York River beyond Yorktown forcing 
several to move to the Gloucester side. 
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On October lQ the first parallel was completed and 
two new batteries, one on the extreme left and another in 
the center, were completed. They had been delayed because 
sufficient horses and wagons were not available to simul-
taneously pull all the guns and ammunition required for 
the parallel. Following completion of the batteries on 
the right, the Americans loaned their horses and wagons to 
the French to speed up the work.36 These new batteries were 
equipped with the heavy thirty-two pounder siege guns. The 
power of these weapons when they opened fire on October 10 
came as a frightening surprise to General Cornwallis. In 
a letter to Clinton on October 11, he stated: 
On the evening of the 9th their batteries opened·, and 
have since continued firing without intermission, with 
about forty pieces of cannon, mostly heavy, and six-
teen mortars, from eight to sixteen inches. We have 
lost about seventy men, and many of our works are con-
siderably damaged. With such works on disadvantageous 
ground, against so powerful an attack, we cannot hope 
to make a very long resistance.37 
The sheer volume of the huge shells crossing the sky from 
the American· to the British lines made a "very beautiful, 
JS though at the same time dreadful appearance." 
October 11 marked a significant point in the siege 
when the second parallel was opened at a distance of only 
two hundred fifty yards from the British fortifications. 
On this day Steuben arid his division were once more in 
the trenches. Steuben instructed each of his men to carry 
a shovel, spade, or grubbing hoe, with every second man 
to also carry a fascine. By morning the division had con-
structed an entrenchment seven hundred fifty yards long, 
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three and one-half feet deep and seven feet wide.~9 All 
this time the cannonading on the American and French lines 
was becoming more intense as each subsequent battery became 
operational. The British, too, responded with a "very 
heavY fire of • • • shot and shells going over our heads 
in a continual blaze the whole night. 1140 
At no time were the men occupying the trenches at 
all safe. Even Steuben and Wayne from their position in 
the new paralle~lp, came under fire from a British battery. 
The Baron, perceiving himself in danger, :~ :~ -~ threw 
himself into a trench. General Wayne in the jeopardy 
of the moment fell on him. The Baron, turning his 
eyes, saw it was his brigadier: "I always knew you 
were a brave general," says he, "but I did not know 
you were so perfect in every point of duty. You 
cover your general's retreat in the best manner pos-
sible.1141 
As a result of this near miss, Steuben issued an 
order designed to keep the men alert. It said: 
The Soldiers (are) not to be allowed to lay down in 
the night, but remain as in the daytime with their 
arms in their hands. Officers (are) to remain at 
their respective posts. No fashines (are) to be 
untied nor made use of in any mann~r whatsoever but 
for the construction of the Works.42 . 
By October 12 Steuben was ready to be relieved 
after the digging and firing of the night before. Just 
after noon Steuben's troops marched off with drums beating 
and flags flying. The main activity this day rested with 
the incredibly accurate fire of the artillery. 
It is astonishing with what accuracy an experienced 
gunner will make his calculations, that a shell shall 
fall within a few feet of a given point, and burst at 
the precise time, though at a great distance. When a 
shell falls, it whirls round, burrows, and excavates 
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the earth to a cpnsiderable axtent, and bursting, 
makes dreadful havoc around. 3 
The fire was intense enough for General Cornwallis to add 
a postscript to his letter of October 11 to General Clinton 
44 that "we continue to lose men very fast." 
The next day, October 13, Steuben's division once 
more went on fatigue detail to build and repair defensive 
works on their own lines. Several defectors from Yorktown 
reported that the British in the town have been thrown 
into total confusion by the firing. 45 
On October 14 Steuben's division mounted the trenches 
early in order to relieve the light infantry of Lafayette, 
who were to take part in the main action of the day. 46 The 
engineers had reported to Washington that sufficient ·dam-
age had been done to the two advance British redoubts that 
they might now be successfully stormed. 47 Lafayette and 
the Baron de Viomenil each were selected to command a spec-
ial force, to attack the redoubts, and if possible, add 
them to the American defenses. At sundown the two forces 
moved out of the American lines. At 7 p.m. the redoubts 
were attacked with Hamilton leading the force which cap-
tured the one nearest the river (no. 10) and the Baron de 
Viomenil the one away from the river (no. 9). Each was 
taken in about ten minutes. 48 With the redoubts gone, 
the second parallel was completed to the right all the 
way to the York River, and when the American artillery was 
moved forward, it fired almost point blank into the British 
fortifications. 49 Steuben remained in the trenches until 
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about one o'clock in the afternoon of October 15. During 
( ' 
this morning General Washington, Rochambeau, and others 
visited the lines to see the completed parallel.50 While 
there the New York Brigade marched into the captured re-
doubt with drums beating·and flags flying, but Steuben 
hurried out and silenced the activity to prevent their 
being fired upon by the British.5l 
At three o'clock in the morning of October 16, the 
British attacked the American lines with the intention of 
doing what Hamilton and Viomenil had done on October 14, 
capture or destroy some unfinished batteries. Attacking 
the French line to Steuben's left, the British were able 
to storm one battery before being driven back into York-
town. Unsuccessful though this effort was, it gave Corn-
wallis the will to make an effort to escape before surren-
dering. Later during the night of October 16, Cornwallis 
transferred some of his troops by boat across to Gloucester 
Point, but a storm arose about midnight which prevented 
any other attempt to cross. The storm was "Almost as 
severe a storm as I ever remember to have seen," said 
Elias Dayton.52 At dawn, the troops who had crossed came 
back to Yorktown and were met with devastating cannon 
fire from the American lines.53 
As Steuben's men mounted the trenches at eleven 
o'clock a.m. on October 18, 1781, a feeling of expec.tation 
was in the air. At about ten o'clock a scarlet-coated 
drummer had mounted the parapet and began to beat a "parley." 
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With him was an officer waving a white flag, who, aft.er 
being blindfolded, was escorted to General Washington· .• 
The British proposal was to suspend hostilities for twenty-
four hours and appoint commissioners to determine the terms 
of surrender. At first Washington made no response and 
sent the officer back. At four o'clock another flag was 
sent, requesting a cessation of four hours. Washington 
replied that he would suspend firing for two hours in· order 
that Cornwallis oould submit his terms in writing. The 
next day, October 18, Lafayette approached Steuben's posi-
tion to relieve him. Steuben refused, stating that Euro-
pean tradition dictated that he remain on duty until the 
surrender was signed or broken since the first contact for 
surrender had been received during his guard. Although 
Lafayette went to Washington to protest, Steuben was ada-
mant and Washington allowed him to remain.55 
Although Cornwallis complied, it was Washington's 
terms which were insisted upon.56 On October 18, while 
Steuben remained in the trenches, the commissioners con-
sidered the articles of surrender. The morning of Friday, 
October 19, the articles were submitted to General Corn-
wallis with a note from Washington stating his expectation 
that the articles would be signed by eleven o'clock in 
the morning and the troops would march out to surrender 
their arms at two o'clock in the afternoon.57 
About eleven o'clock the articles were signed by 
Cornwallis and the siege of Yorktown was ended. By noon 
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the flags were struck and the first American unit moved , 
into Yorktown. Ensign Ebenezer Denny of the Pennsylvania 
troops, under the command of Colonel Richard Butler, was 
marching at the head of the American column carrying the 
regimental flag. Once inside the British fortifications, 
Denny moved to the parapet to plant the colors. Before 
he could do so, however, Steuben seized the staff and 
ceremoniously stuck it atop the works. At the time the 
troops cheered at the sight of the flag in place, but 
Colonel Butler, watching from the rear, became very angry 
and cursed Steuben as an "arrogant, ignorant, knavish 
foreigner ... 58 Later Butler sent Steuben an insulting 
message which would probably have resulted in a duel if 
Washington and Rochambeau had not been able to calm things 
down.59 
Between 4 and 5 p.m., the British troops, with 
arms and baggage, standards covered but with drums beat-
ing, marched out to surrender. The British army marched 
on the Williamsburg Road past the combined armies of the 
French and Americans, who were aligned by regiments in 
par'ade. In front of each regiment were the generals and 
staff officers. The left of the line included the Ameri-
cans with Generals Washington, Gates, Steuben, and Wayne. 
Then it was over. The war in Virginia had come to an 
end--no more battles to be fought, no more honors to be 
won. On October 20 General Washington wrote a le.tter 
of congratulations, which especially commended the three 
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division comman~ers--Lincoln, Lafayette, and Steuben. 
Baron von Steuben reassessed his position in Vir-
ginia and in the Continental army. As a result, on Nov-
ember 5, 1781, he wrote General Greene that he would be 
unable to join him • 
• • • Pity me then, my dear General, when I assure 
you that I am prevented from following my duty and 
inclination by extreme indigence--an utter incapa-
city of any longer su~porting myself and family. 
(aides, retinue, etc.) 
Hitherto, I have supported myself by drawing on 
account fo much paper money as served to subsist 
my family • • • • The real value of what I have 
drawn does not exceed 150 Guineas. I lost three 
of my own horses & have obliged to purchase others 
at an enormous price and my camp equipment after 
18 months campaign is nearly destroyed. 
Under these circumstances, my Dear General, I mu.st 
necessarily quit. I have obtained permission to. 
go to Philadelphia to settle my accounts with Con-
gress. After four years' fatiguing service, it is 
right I should know on what footing I stand. If I 
have merited nothing I am content. My pay they 
will not dispute • • • • 
I go then, my Dr General uncertain if ever I shall 
have the happiness of seeing you again •..• 60 
When_ the. siege of Yorktown was ended and Corn-
wallis surrendered, the final chapter was written in the 
inquiry into Steuben's conduct. Before leaving Virginia, 
Steuben tried to find out the particulars of the attempt 
by the Virginia Assembly to reinstate an investigation of 
his conduct at Point of Fork, but his letter to Governor 
Nelson, who was soon to resign the governorship, went 
unanswered. 
The first week of November, 1781 saw Steuben leave 
Virginia. He had not come very far down the .. road to 
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glory and great possessions,· he had not successfully 
defended his honor for his actions at Point of Fork, nor 
had he commanded troops under General Greene. He had how-
ever, been field commander and had the satisfaction of see-
ing his opponent General Cornwallis, walk before the assem-
bled Americans and surrender his enemy. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have examined the professional 
ability of Baron von Steuben to determine how successfully 
he accomplished his primary and secondary missions. His 
primary mission, that of providing men and supplies to the 
American Southern Army, had been given to him as a result 
of his success in training the American Army at Valley 
Forge. His secondary mission, as Commander of the Virginia 
Continental and militia forces and as field commander under 
Lafayette and Washington, was the result of need and cir~ 
cumstances. When the British mady the need for a comman-
der paramount he was the senior military man available. 
In the overall evaluation of Steuben during this 
period it is necessary to weigh his accomplishments against 
his failures and determine by either number or significance 
his degree of accomplishment. In accomplishing his goals, 
Steuben must be judged at best a limited success in meeting 
his primary mission and except for Petersburg, unsuccessful 
in meeting hi~ secondary one. 
His success comes from the fact that he recruited 
425 men and sent them to General Greene, and he selected a 
quartermaster staff which was as able as any who had served 
in Virginia. Steuben also reemphasized the need for defen-
sive works to protect Richmond and established Chesterfield 
Court House in an effort to improve the Virginia system of 
supply depots. 
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These accomplishments had occurred in Novemb~r and 
December 1780. During this period, Steuben had foreseen 
complete success for his mission since everything had been 
in proper order. He was hopeful that all the needs of 
General Greene could be met. 1 His initial introduction in-
to Virginia had been assured when General Greene, himself a 
popular figure in the State, ·intorduced him to public offi-
cials and in so doing, emphasized that his staff officer 
carried the complete confidence of the Continental Army and 
General Washington. In return, Steuben received promises 
of cooperation from Governor Jefferson. 
The Virginians likewise responded favorably and his 
popularity increased among Virginia officials to the point 
that in December 1780, the legislature, while awarding 
grants to Continental officers, deeded Steuben fifteen 
thousand acres of land "as testimony of the high sense the 
General Assembly of Virginia entertained of the important 
services rend~red the United States by the honourable Major 
General Baron Steuben. 112 Then on January 1, 1781, Steuben's 
fortunes turned for the worse. 
With General Arnold's movement up the James River, 
two things happened. Steuben became so involved with his 
secondary mission as commander that he no longer could pur-
sue his primary mission and he failed to maintain a good 
relationship with Virginia government officials and instead 
substituted an ever-increasing desire to leave _Virginia 
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and join General Greene. This, in turn, seriously ham-
pered his staff as·they continued their efforts to obtain 
supplies. 
Historians writing of this period of American Revo-
lutionary history point out that Steuben had difficulties 
with Virginia officials while in the state and that these 
difficulties limited his effectiveness.3 John McAuley 
Palmer, one of Steuben's principal biographers, indicates 
that this difficulty began when Virginia came under attack 
and the Virginia legislators sought to identify a scapegoat 
upon whom blame for the success of the British expedition 
could be placed. 4 Friedrich Kapp, the other biographer, 
also states his opinion of the criticism by the Virginians 
by stating that "Steuben has been assailed outrageously • 
and particularly by the government o~ the State. The joy 
of his numerous enemies became apparent when they discovered 
one assailable point in him."5 
Steuqen, trained as a strict disciplinarian in 
the European military style, failed to realize that he 
could have alleviated many of his problems by allaying the 
suspicion, fear, and doubt of the populace. If he had 
defused this fear and panic in the Virginians and kept 
the government aware of events he would have probably 
maintained control of the situation. Instead, Steuben 
increased his own anger and resentment which he directed 
against the Virginians and turned more toward General 
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Greene for relief. The result was an increase in the 
conservatism of the Virginians and a significant loss in 
confidence in Steuben's proposals with less support for 
his requests for supplies and manpower, particularly to 
support the Southern Army. Steuben's initial success in 
meeting his primary mission was now a thing of the past. 
Now he would find success more difficult to attain. The 
reputations of his staff now brought more results than 
did Steuben's. 
Steuben had experience in recruiting troops and 
obtaining supplies but he had none as field commander. In 
fact, since he had assumed his current rank when he came 
to America, he really had no experience as a general either. 
Against the more experienced British generals, Steuben was 
at a distinct disadvantage. 
In every confrontation between Steuben and the 
British there was not a single instance in which he could 
not have donG more to try to insure success. Reasons for 
this vary with point of view. In the biographies of 
Steuben, actions he left undone were rationalized as 
unnecessary or impractical, when in fact they happened 
because he lacked the flexibility to adjust to varied 
battlefield conditions, such as at Petersburg and Point of 
Fork. Other books written about this period show Steuben 
to be a very conservative commander who made errors of 
judgment. 6 As such, he was not able to exercise inno-
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vative tactics and repeatedly retreated when faced with 
pressure by the British instead of trying to achieve the 
upper hand. 
Steuben was conservative, but this basic conser-
vatism was not unusual, as it was possessed by many 
field commanders on both sides. But in those who were 
successful, it was overcome or compensated for, something 
Steuben was unable to do. Further, I believe that his 
conservatism came from a reluctance to risk the army or 
individuals' lives unnecessarily, an uncertainty about 
the capability or reliability of the officers or men, and 
a knowledge that replacements of men or supplies could 
not be obtained. 
In January 1781 Steuben issued instructions to 
meet and engage the British, but lack of experience and 
conservatism made him slow to follow up to see that they 
had been done. These instructions, if carried out, would 
have resulted in confrontations and made General Arnold 
abandon his expedition and return downriver, but Steuben 
was unable to make this happen. In February, Steuben's 
troops had successfully held Arnold at Portsmouth await-
ing the arrival of Lafayette. This combined force would 
have been sufficient to defeat the British if they 
had attacked before Arnold was reinforced by Phillips, 
but caution and adherence to standard rules of war-
fare put Arnold's capture beyond reach. In April, while 
a more experienced Steuben fought credibly against 
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the British at Petersburg, victory was a~ain lost because 
defensive rather than offensive tactics were used. An 
alternative attack by Steuben at City Point might have 
forced the British to retreat. Finally, at Point of Fork, 
more confidence in his troops and more accurate intelli-
gence, enabling him to know the size of Simcoe's force, 
would have opened the way for Steuben to fight instead 
of retreat. In retrospect, virtually any of these en-
counters might have been won if Steuben had offset his 
lack of experience and conservatism by finding and pressing 
some advantage, either of position,. arms, or surprise .. 
By the summer of 1781, Steuben's actions were not 
only being seriously challenged by the Virginians but: were 
coming to the attention of his own superiors as well.7 
On July 10, 1781 George Washington, his staunchest sup-
porter, wrote to Joseph Jones that: "the complaints 
against Baron de Steuben are not more distressing than 
unexpected, ~or I always viewed him in the light of a 
good officer. 118 Lafayette also stated that "the hatred 
of the Virginians toward him was truly hurtful to the 
cause." 9 
If it had not been for Steuben's illness, public 
opinion might well have forced his removal from Virginia. 
As it was, however, he was given one more opportunity to 
prove his value to the American cause. His knowledge of 
siege warfare became invaluable at Yorktown and surely 
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shortened the period needed to reduce the British defenses. 
This was important for with the British fleet coming from 
New York swiftness made the difference. 
' 
In the final analysis, Steuben was no brilliant 
tactician or inspired leader of armies. He was a good 
quartermaster officer and teacher who worked tirelessly 
to carry out his responsibilities but who found that the 
road to "Glory and Great Possessions" was not easy to 
10 travel. 
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